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Abstract--A statistically coherent view of confounding motivated by the controversy over the proper 
control of confounding in the presence of prior knowledge ispresented. Confounding by a covariate C 
in the presence of data on C is distinguished from confounding in the absence of data on C. A covariate 
C is defined to be a nonconfounder in the absence of data on C if the population parameter of interest 
can be unbiasedly estimated (asymptotically) absent data on C. Under this definition, C may be a 
confounder for some parameters of interest and a nonconfounder for others. If C is a confounder for a 
parameter of interest that has a causal interpretation, we call C a causal confounder. When data on C 
are available, C is defined to be a nonconfounder for a particular parameter of interest if and only if 
inference on the parameter of interest does not depend on the data through C. Bayesians, frequentists 
and pure likelihoodists will in general agree on the prior knowledge necessary to render C a non- 
confounder. In particular C will in general be a nonconfounder p ecisely when the crude data ignoring 
C are S-sufficient for the parameter of interest. The intuitive view held by many practicing epidemiologists 
that confounding by C represents a bias of the unadjusted crude estimator is in a sense correct provided 
inference is performed conditional on approximate ancillary statistics that measure the degree to which 
associations in the data differ due to sampling variability from those population associations known 
a priori. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In epidemiologic studies of  the effect of  an exposure E on a disease D, the marginal association 
of  E with D, often called by epidemiologists the crude association, may fail to reflect a causal 
association due to "confounding" by one or more covariates C. On occasion the investigator has 
prior knowledge concerning the associations of  various covariates with either E or D in the source 
population. The proper control o f  confounding in the presence of  prior knowledge has been a 
controversial subject in epidemiology; see, for example, Miettinen and Cook [1], Day et  al. [2] and 
Breslow and Day [3]. Much of  the reason for this lack of  consensus is that confounding remains 
an ill-defined concept. For example, in the most comprehensive article on confounding to date, 
Miettinen and Cook [1] develop "first principles" of  confounding based on inductive, intuitive 
considerations of  various examples. In that paper, Miettinen and Cook state that "confounding 
implies a need and desire to replace the 'crude' estimate of  the effect by one that has been adjusted 
for the covariate at issue". Yet they fail to give a general definition of  an "appropriate adjusted 
estimate". We shall try to offer a formal foundation for their intuitions. 
It is helpful to distinguish confounding in the absence of  data on C from confounding iven data 
on C in order to capture the way a number of  epidemiologists use the word confounding. (Note 
that implicit in Miettinen and Cook's  definition of  confounding is the assumption that data on C 
have been obtained so that an adjusted estimate is available.) For example, in a randomized trial 
in which a risk factor C is not measured, a number of  epidemiologists regard the crude estimator 
of  effect as unconfounded. This reflects the fact that in a randomized study, C is as likely to be 
positively as negatively associated with exposure in the data at hand. I f  data on C have not been 
recorded for data analysis, we would feel neither the "need nor desire" to adjust the crude estimate, 
for in which direction would we adjust it? But if data on the risk factor C become available and, 
by chance, a large E-C  association exists in the data, then the crude estimate of  effect is now 
regarded as confounded, since we would desire to replace the crude estimate by an estimate adjusted 
for C [1]. Therefore, C was a nonconfounder absent data on C but a confounder given data on C. 
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In Sections 2-4, we develop from first principles a theory of confounding in the absence of data 
on a covariate C. We define in Section 4 a covariate C to be a confounder for a particular parameter 
of interest in the absence of data on C if and only if the population parameter of interest cannot 
be unbiasedly estimated (asymptotically) in the absence of data on C. Under this definition, C may 
be a confounder under one sampling design and a nonconfounder under another. Furthermore, 
C may be a confounder for some parameters of interest and a nonconfounder for others. Miettinen 
and Cook's contrary claim that definitions of confounding should be independent of the parameter 
of interest reflects their decision to restrict attention to causal parameters that compare the 
observed outcomes of an exposed group to the outcomes that would have been observed in this 
group in the absence of exposure. If C is a confounder for a causal parameter, C will be called 
a causal confounder. From Section 4 onward, we suppose that the study population has been 
sampled from a large near-infinite superpopulation a d that the causal parameter of interest is a 
parameter of the superpopulation. The motivation for this superpopulation model is presented in
Section 3. In Section 4 we consider the prior knowledge necessary to render C a nonconfounder 
absent data on C for the study designs and effect parameters most commonly employed in 
epidemiologic research on the etiology of disease. 
In Section 3, we show that under a deterministic outcome model, standard binomial intervals 
may fail to cover the causal parameter of interest at the nominal rate even in the absence of bias 
when, following Miettinen and Cook [1], we take the causal parameters ofinterest to be parameters 
associated with the observed study population (regardless of whether the observed study 
population was sampled from a large superpopulation). New interval estimators are proposed that, 
in this setting, improve upon the performance of standard "binomial intervals". 
Informally in Section 5 and formally in Section 8, we present aconsistent s atistical interpretation 
of Miettinen and Cook's intuitive concept of confounding iven data on C. We consider the 
implications for inference of discovering, when we have collected ata on C, that associations of 
C with exposure and/or disease in the data differ from those associations known to hold in the 
population. Following Miettinen and Cook, we define C to be a confounder in the data at hand 
if the crude estimate of the parameter of interest differs from an appropriate adjusted estimate. We 
demonstrate hat the requirement that Miettinen and Cook's appropriate adjusted estimators be 
asymptotically efficient is necessary in general to reach their intuitive, inductive decisions. 
Therefore, from their intuitive point of view, inefficient estimators, even when unbiased, require 
adjustment. Our position that the intuitive epidemiological concept of confounding depends on 
efficiency considerations i  heretical. Most epidemiologists assume that a crude estimate is 
confounded by a covariate C if the crude estimate does not equal the observed value of any 
"intuitively unbiased" estimator in the data at hand. For example, Miettinen and Cook describe 
the "confounding bias" of a crude estimate in their recent paper. We will show that Miettinen and 
Cook appear to regard as "intuitively unbiased" estimators that can center large-sample confidence 
intervals, i.e. estimators that are locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased. Furthermore, when 
conditioned on approximate ancillary statistics that measure the degree to which associations 
observed in the data differ due to sampling variability from our a priori knowledge of the 
corresponding population associations, inefficient unconditionally (asymptotically) unbiased esti- 
mators become conditionally (asymptotically) biased. Conversely unconditionally efficient esti- 
mators are conditionally (asymptotically) unbiased. Thus, the two approaches to confounding via 
efficiency and bias can be unified through the recognition that epidemiologists (such as Miettinen 
and Cook) are implicitly conditioning on certain approximate ancillary statistics. In Section 5(G), 
we show that, when data on C are unavailable, the above definition of a "confounder in the data 
at hand" reduces to the previous definition of "a confounder in the absence of data on C." 
Although Miettinen and Cook restricted their attention to point estimation, most investigators 
are interested in confidence intervals as well. In fact large-sample Wald-type confidence intervals 
(i.e. intervals constructed from the maximum likelihood estimate and its estimated standard error) 
are the most common method of summarizing the inferences drawn from a given data set in present 
day epidemiologic practice. If we require that frequentist inference be performed conditional on 
ancillary statistics and furthermore that, as suggested by Buehler [4], continuous perturbations in 
model specification result in continuous perturbations in the inferences drawn from a given data 
set, then in accord with the intuition of epidemiologists, inference based on Wald-type confidence 
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intervals accurate to O (N -3/2) in variance [5] would require that appropriate adjusted estimators 
be viewed as conditionally asymptotically unbiased rather than as unconditionally efficient. We 
show that long before Efron and Hinkley [5] formally considered conditional inference accurate 
to O(N -3/2) in variance, analysts of epidemiologic data were intuitively requiring that their 
conditional inference be accurate to O (N -3/2) in variance. 
Since the intuitive epidemiologic concept of bias corresponds closely to the formal statistical 
concept of asymptotic bias, the above statistical interpretation f confounding in terms of intuitive 
(i.e. asymptotic) bias had to be based on asymptotic (i.e. large sample theory). In Section 6 an exact 
theory of confounding applicable to small samples or sparse data is developed. In the presence of 
data on C, we define C to be an (exact) nonconfounder given data on C if and only if inference on 
the parameter of interest does not depend on the data through C for all possible data outcomes. 
We show in Section 6 that Bayesians, frequentists, and pure likelihoodists will in general agree on 
the prior knowledge necessary to render C a nonconfounder given data on C in both follow-up 
and case-control studies. Specifically C will in general be a nonconfounder given data on C exactly 
when the crude data ignoring C comprise a cut [6] whose marginal distribution depends on the 
parameter of interest. We then investigate the prior knowledge necessary to make C a non- 
confounder given C for the study designs and effect parameters considered in Section 4. Of 
particular concern is the role played by the rare disease assumption i  case-control studies. In 
Section 6, in the interest of concreteness and notational simplicity, E, C and D will represent 
dichotomous random variables. Section 7 extends the results of Section 6 to the general case when 
E, C and D are arbitrary random variables. 
Throughout he paper, to help focus our discussion, we shall consider the validity of the 
following principles endorsed by Miettinen and Cook: 
1. If (a) in a case-control study the exposure E and a covariate C are known to be 
unassociated in the source population or (b) if in either a follow-up or case-control 
study C is known a priori not to be a risk factor for disease in the unexposed 
population, then the crude estimate of the parameter of interest ignoring data on 
C is appropriate irrespective of associations observed in the data. 
2. In a follow-up or case-control study if C is known a priori to be a risk factor for 
disease, then even if C does not appear to be a risk factor in the data, the crude 
estimate is in general inappropriate. In a case-control study if E and C are known 
to be associated in the source population, then even if E and C are unassociated 
in the data among the controls, the crude estimate is in general inappropriate. 
3. In a follow-up study if no E-C association exists in the source population from 
which the data were sampled, but an E-C association exists in the data, a stratified 
estimate of the parameter of interest, adjusting for C, is required. 
4. In a follow-up study if no E-C association exists in the data, the crude estimate 
is appropriate irrespective of prior knowledge. 
We will demonstrate that principle 1 holds for case-control studies only if we add to supposition 
(a) of principle 1 the suppositions that (1) the disease is rare over the follow-up period and (2) the 
sampled controls constitute only a small fraction of the potential controls. Principle 4 requires 
modification. 
2. CONFOUNDING WITHOUT SAMPLING VARIABILITY 
2(A ). Descriptive Epidemiology 
Consider an unmatched follow-up study in which at the start of follow-up each of the N study 
subjects is either exposed (written E or El) or unexposed (E0 or E). Measurements are taken at 
start of follow-up on a dichotomous covariate with levels C~ (C) and Co (C) and, at end of 
follow-up, on disease status with levels D (or D~) and/~ (or Do). The investigator bserves the 
empirical distribution of E, C and D. For example, p (EIC) is the proportion of subjects with 
covariate l vel C who are exposed, p (DIE, C) is the proportion of exposed subjects at level C who 
develop disease, cRD = p (DIE) -p  (DIE) is the crude risk difference. Such observable quantities 
are the parameters of interest for descriptive pidemiology. 
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2(B). A Deterministic Model Useful in Etiologic Research 
In etiologic research, on the other hand, the parameters of interest are intrinsically unobservable 
(i.e. nonidentifiable). For example, Miettinen and Cook suggest that causal parameters of interest 
in etiologic research should be expressed in terms of comparisons (e.g., the difference) between the 
observed number of cases occurring in the exposed group (O) and the number of cases that would 
have been observed in the exposed group had that group been unexposed (i.e. the expected number 
of cases, EX). 
Specifically, we define O/Ne-  EX/NE to be the causal risk difference in the exposed, where NE 
is the number of exposed subjects. O/Ne is the observable parameter p (DIE). EX is unobservable, 
since the outcome of exposed subjects when unexposed cannot be observed. 
Note that in order for EX to be a well defined number, it is necessary to entertain adeterministic 
model in which each study subject is one of four possible types according to their response to the 
presence and absence of exposure. Letting 1 indicate disease occurs and 0 indicate disease does not 
occur over the study period, we can tabulate the types in the following table (see Greenland and 
Robins [7]): 
"Common" description of type Exposed Unexposed 
Type 1, No effect (individual "doomed") I 1 
Type 2. Exposure causative (individual susceptible) 1 0 
Type 3. Exposure preventive (individual susceptible) 0 1 
Type 4. No effect (individual immune to disease) 0 0 
We define Nj, NjE and Njee to be respectively the total number of subjects, the number of exposed 
subjects, and the number of exposed subjects in stratum C who are of type j with j e { 1, 2, 3, 4}. 
Similarly, Pie = Nje/Ne is the proportion of exposed subjects of type j. Also, O = NIE + N2E, 
EX =Nlr  + N3e, P (DIE) = (N~ + N3g)/Ng = P~g + P3g, and (O/NE- EX/NE) = P2e - P3E. 
2(C). Confounding 
Following Miettinen and Cook [1] and Greenland and Robins [7], we say there is no confounding 
for the causal risk difference in the exposed if and only if the crude risk difference quals the causal 
risk difference in the exposed. This condition holds if and only i fp(D IE0)= EX/Ne (that is, the 
empirical rate of disease in the unexposed equals the rate of disease that would have been observed 
in the exposed had they been unexposed). Since EX is an unobservable, we can never know whether 
confounding exists. Under this definition, we can have confounding without needing to refer to 
any covariate that is the cause of that confounding (i.e. we have confounding without confounders 
[7]). 
2(D). Confounding by a Covariate C 
Suppose there is confounding for the causal risk difference in the exposed. We now define 
circumstances under which it is legitimate to say that the confounding is due to a covariate C. To 
do so, we shall need the following definitions. 
Definition 
We say there is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences in the exposed if, 
in each stratum of a covariate, the rate of disease in the unexposed stratum members equals the 
rate of disease that would have been observed in the exposed stratum members had they been un- 
exposed. [That is, if for i E {0, 1 } (Oc, - Ec, )/Nec, = RDc,. Equivalently, EXc~/Nec, = P (D I E, Ci). 
Here RDc, ~ p (D[E, C~) - p (D I E, C~). Nec, and Oc~ are respectively the total number of subjects 
and the number of diseased subjects who are (E, C~), and EXc, is the number of those Nec, subjects 
who would have been diseased if unexposed.] 
We shall say that the question "Is C a confounder for the causal risk difference in the exposed?" 
is meaningful (i.e. is nonvacuous) only if there is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal 
risk difference in the exposed. 
This definition was motivated by the observation that if there is confounding for the 
stratum-specific causal risk differences in the exposed then, in general, even when data on E, C and 
D are available, the parameter of interest, O/Ne - EX/Ne, will not equal any observable parameter. 
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On the other hand, if there is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences in the 
exposed, it follows, as a mathematical theorem, that O/Ne-EX/NE equals the observable 
internally standardized morbidity difference (sMD), i.e. the (internally) standardized risk difference 
with weights taken from the exposed population, specifically, 
sMD = wlERDc + (1 - wlE)RD¢, 
with wtE = NEc/(NEc + Nrc). 
It follows that, given there is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences in 
the exposed, C is a confounder for the causal risk difference in the exposed if and only if 
cRD ~ sMD = (0 -  EX)/Ne. When confounding by C exists, the causal risk difference in the 
exposed can be computed when data on C are present (since one can compute the sMD), but not 
when data on C are absent (i.e. when data on C have not been recorded for data analysis). An 
alternative approach would have been to define C to be a confounder for the causal difference in 
the exposed whenever cRD # sMD. Under this alternative approach, when cRD = sMD 
(0 - EX)/Ne, we would say that even though C is not a confounder, there must exist confounding 
within levels of C by some other risk factor. 
2(E). Confounding for the Causal Risk Difference 
Miettinen and Cook restricted their consideration to comparisons between O and EX. In fact, 
other causal parameters may be of interest. For example, one may be interested in comparing the 
total number of cases that would have been observed if the entire population had been exposed 
(N1 + N2) to the total number of cases that would have been observed if the entire population had 
been unexposed (NI + N3). Specifically, define [(Nl + N2) - (NI + N3)]/N = (N2 - N3)/N = P2 - P3 
to be the population causal risk difference. 
By analogy to our definitions in Section 2(C), we say that there is no confounding for the 
(population) causal risk difference if and only if cRD = (N2 - N3)/N. 
Definition 
There is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences if, for i E {0, 1}, 
RDc, = (N2c, - N3c,)/Nc,, where e.g., N2c, is the number of Type 2 subjects in stratum Ci. 
Further we say that the question "Is C a confounder for the causal risk difference?" is meaningful 
only if there is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences. When there is no 
confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences, then it follows, as a mathematical 
theorem, that (N2 - N3)/N is the observable standardized risk difference with weights taken from 
the entire population (which we denote sRD), where 
Nc 
sRD-wtRDc+(1-w l )RDe and Wl=Nc+N e. 
Given that there is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences, we say that 
C is a confounder for the causal risk difference if and only if cRD ~ sRD = (N2 - N3)/N. 
2(F). Conditions for Nonconfounding 
It is easy to show algebraically that sMD = cRD if either C is not an (observable) risk factor 
among the unexposed, or E and C are unassociated, that is if either ORocl~ = 1 or OREc = 1. 
(OR~clr is the observable odds ratio comparing D and C among the unexposed.) Similarly, 
sRD = cRD if either C is not a risk factor in both the exposed and unexposed or E and C are 
unassociated, i.e. if either ORocl~ = 1 = ORoclE or if ORec = 1. 
2(G). A Comparison with Miettinen and Cook 
Miettinen and Cook state that C is a nonconfounder if either C is unassociated with exposure 
or C is a nonrisk factor among the unexposed. Our results show that Miettinen and Cook were 
implicitly assuming that (1) the causal parameter of interest is the causal risk difference in the 
exposed (or some other function of O and EX such as causal risk ratio among the exposed) and 
(2) there is no confounding for the stratum-specific causal risk differences in the exposed. Thus, 
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Table 1 
C C Crude 
E ,E E E E ,E 
D 30 100 120 50 150 150 
Total 200 400 400 200 600 600 
RD c = - 10/100 RDe = 5/100 cRD = 0 
as the example below demonstrates, Miettinen and Cook's concept of confounding lumps together 
two distinct issues: (1) what are the causal parameters of interest, and (2) what restrictions must 
exist on the associations of C with E or D in the population so that the causal parameter of interest 
equals the crude parameter. In contrast, we have allowed conditions for confounding to depend 
on the particular parameter of interest, keeping selection of the causal parameter of interest distinct 
from the issue of whether C is a "confounder" for the chosen parameter of interest. 
Example 
For the population represented in Table 1, suppose there is no confounding for the stratum- 
specific causal risk differences or the stratum-specific causal risk differences in the exposed. Then 
there is no confounding for the causal risk difference in the exposed since sMD = cRD (because 
ORoctg = 1). Note that exposure is protective in stratum C. Now suppose we wish to consider a 
public health intervention, but that our options are limited by the fact that C-status is too expensive 
to measure routinely. Then, our options would be (1) no intervention, (2) expose everyone and 
(3) prevent all exposure. Since cRD = sMD = 0, it follows that the public health impact of options 
(1) and (3) would be the same. To compare options (2) and (3), a causal parameter of interest would 
be the causal risk difference, i.e. the sRD. But sRD = 0.5(-0.1) + 0.5(0.05) = -0.025 # cRD = 0. 
Thus the optimal public health decision is to expose veryone, and C is a confounder for the causal 
risk difference because ORoctr # 1. 
2(H). Summary: Confounding for Causal and Observable Parameters 
We summarize the approach to confounding iven in Sections 2(A)-(G) in the following steps. 
Each step is illustrated (in parentheses) by a specific example: 
(1) define the causal parameter of interest, (e.g. the causal risk difference P: - P3); 
(2) decide whether one is willing to make a nonidentifiable (i.e. untestable) assump- 
tion necessary to equate the causal parameter of interest to an observable 
parameter (e.g. the assumption of no confounding for the stratum-specific causal 
risk differences, so that P2 -  P3 = sRD). If not, the question of whether a 
covariate C is a confounder for the causal parameter of interest is vacuous. If 
one is willing to make such an assumption, then; 
(3) determine whether the (now) observable parameter of interest can be computed 
from data on E, C and D (e.g. sRD can be computed from data on E, C and 
D). If not, the question of whether C is a confounder for this parameter is
vacuous ;  
(4) if the observable parameter of interest is computable from data on E, C and D, 
define C to be a nonconfounder for this parameter if and only if the observable 
parameter is computable from data on E and D alone (e.g. if and only if 
sRD = cRD); 
(5) determine the conditions that must be satisfied by the associations of the 
covariate with exposure and/or disease in the study population in order for C 
to be a nonconfounder (e.g. ORDcle=ORoclg= 1 or ORec= 1 implies 
sRD = cRD). 
An investigator may be interested in an observable parameter that has no causal interpretation. 
For example, a life insurance company which is interested in selling policies to 65 y olds might wish 
to compare the probability of death before age 80 among 65 y olds who exercise regularly (the 
exposed) to that of 65 y olds who do not when controlling for cigarette smoking history regardless 
of whether any difference in life expectancy (when adjusted for smoking) can be causally attributed 
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to the effect of exercise. If the stratum-specific risk difference is constant over levels of smoking, 
then sMD = sRD is the observable parameter of interest, and we can determine whether smoking 
is a confounder for this observable parameter by carrying out steps 3-5 above. 
In summary, to determine whether a covariate C is a confounder for a particular observable 
parameter, carry out steps 3-5. To determine whether it is a causal confounder, carry out steps 
1-5. 
We can extend the above definitions to define "confounding by a covariate C controlling for a 
covariate F". Specifically if the parameter of interest is computable given data on E, C, D and F, 
then we define C to be a confounder (nonconfounder) controlling for F if the parameter of interest 
cannot (can) be computed from data on E, D and F. 
3. THE INTRODUCTION OF SAMPLING VARIABILITY 
3(A). A Superpopulation Model 
Suppose in the epidemiologic study described in Section 2(A), 30 of 60 exposed subjects develop 
disease. Then, according to the deterministic model described in Sections 2(A) and 2(B), p (DIE) 
is known to be exactly 0.5. There can be no sampling variability since (1) each exposed subject's 
outcome is predetermined and (2) we have not assumed that our study population is a sample 
drawn from a larger population. 
In contrast, the standard approach taken by most epidemiologists would be to report a 95% 
binomial confidence interval of 0.5 + 1.96x/(0.5)(0.5)/60 for the unknown parameter p (DIE). The 
model implicit in the standard approach is as follows. 
Superpopulation model. The study population has been sampled at random from a near infinite 
superpopulation. The parameter p (DIE) is the proportion of exposed subjects in the super- 
population who become diseased and p (D[E) = 30/60 is the proportion of the (sampled) exposed 
study subjects who become diseased. Under this sampling model, the number of diseased exposed 
study subjects is a binomial random variable (upon hypothetical resamplings of 60 exposed study 
subjects from the superpopulation). 
An alternative model that would (1) give binomial confidence intervals for p (D[E) but (2) not 
require the introduction of a hypothetical superpopulation would be a model in which (a) each 
exposed study subject's outcome was a Bernoulli random variable and (b) the probability of 
developing disease over the study interval was the same for all exposed study subjects, p (DIE) 
would be that common probability. 
If the probability of developing disease varied among study subjects, the number of exposed 
study subjects who become diseased would not be a binomial random variable. Therefore, we reject 
this alternative model as biologically implausible since the model implies that there is no 
between-individual variation in any risk factor for disease. 
In summary, any epidemiologist who (1) reports a binomial confidence interval for p (DIE) and 
(2) who acknowledges that there exists between-individual variation in risk must be implicitly 
assuming (1) the study subjects were sampled from a near-infinite superpopulation a d (2) that all 
inferences are concerned with the parameters of that superpopulation. 
Since, in most epidemiologic studies, study subjects have not been randomly sampled from any 
near-infinite superpopulation, the superpopulation model is a fiction. Why then is the model 
routinely used? We offer a possible reason. 
An investigator often wishes to generalize his or her findings from the study population to some 
large target population. For example, an investigator, who is giving consideration torecommending 
a public health intervention, would hope to have studied a population that is representative of the 
population of potential recipients of the intervention. The simplest possible model is to consider 
the study population to be a random sample of a larger population of subjects who are potential 
recipients of the intervention. The use of a hypothetical superpopulation model can sometimes be 
justified on subjective Bayesian grounds by use of DeFinetti's theorem [8]. In general an 
investigator should not entertain a superpopulation model if (1) the population of potential 
recipients is believed to differ from the study population on unmeasured disease risk factors to an 
extent hat cannot be accounted for by sampling variability or (2) the size of the pool of potential 
recipients is not much larger than the size of the study population. 
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3(B). Randomization: an Alternative Sampling Model 
Miettinen and Cook make it clear that in a follow-up study they wish to treat (a) disease 
outcomes as deterministic and (b) the causal parameters associated with the observed study 
population as the causal parameters of interest (regardless of whether that study population was 
sampled from a larger target population). 
In this set-up, it is unlikely that any investigator would be willing to assume that the distribution 
of risk factors was so well balanced across exposure groups that there is no confounding for the 
causal risk difference or the causal risk difference in the exposed. [More generally, even when data 
on various risk factors have been obtained, it is unlikely that an investigator would be willing to 
assume the distribution of unmeasured risk factors for disease is so well balanced across exposure 
groups within levels of measured risk factors that there would be no residual confounding for the 
causal risk difference or the causal risk difference in the exposed after controlling for the measured 
factors, i.e. an investigator would not be willing to assume that sMD = (O-  EX)/Ne or 
sRD = (172 - N3)/N.] Nonetheless, an investigator might be willing to make subjective statements 
such as "although there may be some small association of risk factors with exposure, I do not 
believe such associations are systematic". 
We can give a formal meaning to such a subjective statement by making the assumption that 
nature assigned exposure to ArE randomly chosen study subjects and left the remaining N~ subjects 
unexposed. Ne and Nr are considered fixed by design. That is, the observed study was a randomized 
trial performed by nature. Then the value of the empirical risk difference, ~RD, depends on the 
particular Are subjects who received exposure. Therefore, in hypothetical rerandomizations, ERD 
has a well defined distribution. [The " over cRD is used to stress that we are now regarding cRD 
as a random variable with a distribution defined by hypothetical rerandomizations. The value of 
ERD that we observed reflects the (random) exposure assignment that actually occurred.] In 
particular, if we define (using the notation in Copas [9]) m~ = (Nl + N2)/N, mo = (N~ + N3)/N and 
13 = (N2 + N3)/N, then E(ERD) = m, - m0. ml - mo is the causal risk difference. Thus, although in 
a randomized trial, in general ERD # m~ - m0, nonetheless E (ERD) = m~ - m0. Furthermore, ERD 
is asymptotically normal with asymptotic variance, 
N Var A (~RD) = m~ (1 - ml ) 
PE 
where PE = Ne/N and 
mo(1 - mo) ~-R, (1) 
Pt 
R = m0 + ml - 2m0ml - ml(1 - ml) - m0(1 - m0) - 13, (2) 
where, by its definition, the range of possible 13 is Im0 - mjl ~< 13 ~< min(m0 + m,, 2 - m0 - mr). 
For a proof see Appendix A. 
Lemma 3.1 
For all possible 13, R <~ 0. The inequality is strict except when fl = 0 and m~ = m0. 
Proof See Appendix A. 
ml and m0 can be unbiasedly and consistently estimated by rht =ff(D IE) and rh0 =p(D IE) 
where p (D IE)  is the proportion of unexposed subjects observed to have disease. Unfortunately 
since fl is unidentifiable, NVarA(~RD) cannot be consistently estimated [9]. Nonetheless, we can 
set conservative large sample confidence intervals (i.e. confidence intervals that are guaranteed 
to cover at least their nominal rate) for ml -m0 by deriving a consistent estimator, say 
NV~ra(~RD), of a number that is at least as large as NVarA(~RD). This can be accomplished if,
in equation (2), we replace 13 by a consistent estimator of its minimum possible value, that is, by 
Irf i l -  r~ol and, in both equations (1) and (2), we replace m~ and m0 by their empirical estimates 
rh~ and rh 0. On simplifying, we have that if rh~- n~ 0>i 0, 
NV~ra(~RD) = r~(1 - r~tl) + r~t°(1 - rfi°) + (2n~-  ~,)(1 - n~,) -- tf'to(1 - n~o). (3) 
PE Pt 
If ~RD was, as in the superpopulation model, the difference of two binomial proportions, its 
variance would be estimated by the first two terms on the fight side of the equation (3). It then 
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follows from Lemma 3.1 that, when the causal risk difference is nonzero, the usual binomial 
confidence intervals for the causal risk difference in a randomized trial will be unnecessarily 
conservative since, taken together, the last two terms in equation (3) are negative if rh~ - th0 # 0. 
In contrast, the usual binomial test of the null hypothesis mt = m0 need not be conservative [since, 




ArE = 100, Nr = 100, rh~ = 1--~' th0 = 100' 
then "binomial" 95% confidence intervals for the causal risk difference, m~-  m0, are 
0.25 + 1.96/(0.4)(0.6) + (0.85)(0.15) = 0.250 + 0.118 
- ~/ 100 - 
w h i l e  conservative 95% confidence intervals based on equation (3) are 
0.25 + 1.96 I(0"4) (0"6) +100(0"85)(0"15) k [2(0.15) - (0.4)] (1200- 0.4) - 0.15 (0.85)T/2 
I . -  - . I  
---- 0.250 _+ 0.102. 
Thus, the binomial intervals are 16% wider than necessary. 
Nonetheless, before one begins to routinely report confidence intervals for the causal risk 
difference in randomized trials based on equation (3), two caveats are in order. First, in moderate 
(as opposed to large) samples, it will happen frequently that "Wald" type intervals based on 
~RD + 1.96 ~/V~ra(SRD) will exclude the null even when standard X 2 or Fisher exact tests for 
mt= m0 do not "reject" at the 5% level. In such cases, one should not "reject" the null hypothesis. 
(The problem with Wald confidence intervals is that V~rA(SRD) is evaluated at rh~ - rh o rather than 
at the null hypothesis mt = m0.) 
Second, confidence intervals based on equation (3) are valid only if a deterministic model for 
disease outcome is correct. If outcomes were, in fact, stochastic, the causal risk difference would 
be defined to be 
I,~l [p (D ,E, i)-p (D ,E, i)]}/N, 
where, for example, p (D [E, i) is the probability that subject i will become diseased if exposed. 
In this stochastic world, ~RD is still unbiased for the causal risk difference in hypothetical 
rcrandomizations but VarA(~RD) is not given by equation (1). [For example, if p(D IE, i) and 
p (DIE, i) did not depend on i, VarA(SRD) is given by the usual binomial variance.] One cannot 
empirically determine whether outcomes are stochastic or deterministic. 
Suppose now, following Miettinen and Cook, that our interest is in the causal risk difference 
in the exposed study population, and we have assumed that (a) disease outcomes are deterministic 
and (b) nature conducts a randomized trial. Then, the causal risk difference in the exposed is a 
random variable (and not a population parameter) since O and EX both depend on the particular 
set of subjects who were exposed. For a random variable, the analog of a confidence interval is 
a prediction interval. Specifically, a prediction interval is rule that gives for any data realization 
an interval. This interval may or may not contain the unobservable random variable (O - EX)/Ne 
associated with that realization. If, in hypothetical rerandomizations, 95% of realizations produce 
an interval that includes (the realization-specific) (O -EX) /Nr ,  we have, by definition, a 95% 
prediction interval for (O -EX)/NE. 
In Appendix A we show that a valid 95% large sample prediction interval for (O - EX)/Ne is 
~RD + 1.96 ~ NrNz (4) 
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Example 3.2 
Given the data in Example 3.1, we compute a prediction interval of 
0.250 + 1.96 J(0.15) (0.85) 200 
_ (100)2 = 0.250 + 0.099 
under the randomization distribution. Thus, the usual "binomial" interval (computed in Example 
3.1) is 18% too wide. 
Note: equation (4) can be written as 
Frn0(! -_rn0) n~0(1 - r~0)] '/2 
eRD __ 1.96 k Ne + -N-~ _~ " (4a) 
For certain states of nature, "binomial intervals" for the causal risk difference in the exposed (in 
contrast to "binomial intervals" for the causal risk difference) may be anti-conservative, that is they 
may fail to attain their nominal coverage rates. To see this, note that the prediction interval given 
in equation (4a) differs from the usual "binomial interval" only in that the second term under the 
square root sign in equation (4a) is [r~0(1-r~o)]/Ne rather than [ r~(1-~) ] /Ne .  Thus, if 
[r~l (1 - r~l )]/Ne is greater than [r~0(1 - n~0)]/N E (as in our example) binomial confidence intervals 
will be conservative. If [r~ (1 - r~ )]/NE is less than [nrl0(1 -- n~0)]/Nz, binomial confidence intervals 
will be anti-conservative. (This follows from the fact that, in large samples, the prediction interval 
given by equation (4a) covers the causal risk difference in the exposed in precisely 95% of 
hypothetical rerandomizations.) In fact, in the limit as m~ ~ 1 and Ne/N~ ~ O, the rate at which 
the usual "binomial interval" covers the random variable (O-EX)/Ne approaches 0! 
We can extend this randomization model to include measured covariates as follows. If data on 
a dichotomous covariate C has been obtained, and one believes that within levels of C there is no 
systematic association of exposure with unmeasured risk factors, then we could assume that, for 
i ~ {0, 1}, nature exposed at random Nec, subjects and left N~c, subjects unexposed. 
3(C). Relationships Between the Superpopulation and Randomization Models 
One might find it surprising that the variance of the crude risk difference in the deterministic 
randomization model is less than the binomial variance, even asymptotically. Here we try to make 
it intuitively clear why this is so by, in a sense, imbedding our randomization model within the 
superpopulation model. 
Subjective statements such as "exposure is not systematically associated with other risk factors 
in the observed study population" can be represented in our superpopulation model by assuming 
that Pie = Pjg,J E {1, 2, 3, 4} (i.e. the distribution of the four types are the same in the exposed and 
unexposed). Under this assumption there exists no confounding in the superpopulation. Even so, 
we will, in general, have confounding for both the "causal risk difference" and the "causal risk 
difference in the exposed" in the observed study population, since/~e =/~E, J e { 1, 2, 3, 4} will be 
false due to chance associations of exposure with risk factors in the sample. (We have put a ~ 
over the parameters of the observed study population to emphasize that these parameters are 
random variables under hypothetical resamplings of the superpopulation.) Suppose an investigator 
accepts the superpopulation model as a sampling model, but his interest lies in the causal risk 
difference of the observed study population (i.e. [P2 - P3]) rather than the causal risk difference 
of the superpopulation (P2 - P3). (P2 - P3) and (P2 - P3) will, in general, differ from one another. 
This reflects the fact that (P2 -/~3) is a random variable with nonzero variance since its value will 
depend on the particular Ne exposed and NE unexposed subjects ampled. Consider the set of 
hypothetical resamplings of the superpopulation in which the vector (5?z, 5?2, 5?3,5?4) is fixed at its 
observed value, but (5?~E, 572z, 573E, 5?4e) is not fixed. Then, the conditional distribution of this latter 
vector, given the former vector, is the same as the distribution of the vector (57~e, 5?2e, 5?3e, 5?4E) 
in a randomized trial with parameters equal to (571,572,5?3, 5?4). That is, we have generated 
the randomization distribution as a conditional distribution within the superpopulation 
model. It follows that the conditional expectation of the empirical crude risk difference 
E [~RDI(5?t, 5?2, 5?3, 5?4)] is (P2 -/~3) and the conditional variance is given by equation (1) where, 
m~, m0 and ~ now will depend on the particular superpopulation subjects that were sampled. Now, 
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it is a well known identity that 
Var (~RD) = Var {E [~RD L (b?~, iV2, )~3, N4)]} + E {Var {~RD I(bT~, ,@2,-@3, N4)]}. 
We have previously seen that, unconditionally, Var(cRD) is the usual binomial variance for the 
risk difference ~RD. Furthermore, as discussed above, Var [(/~2 -/~3)] is nonzero and of the same 
order as Var(~RD). It follows that on average Var[~RDI(NI,-@2,-@3, ,@4)] [given by equation (1)] 
must be less than the binomial variance. 
Thus, a valid conditional confidence interval for/~2 - P3 is given by ~RD + 1.96 V~rA(~RD) [as 
defined in equation (3)]. It follows that this interval is also an unconditional 95% prediction interval 
for the random variable P2-  P3- On the other hand, the unconditional confidence interval for 
/'2 - P3 (which is the usual binomial interval) is wider because of the uncertainty in/'2 - P3 given 
knowledge of/~2 - P3. Thus, an investigator who (1) accepts adeterministic superpopulation model 
but (2) has interest in the causal risk difference and/or the causal risk difference in the exposed of 
the (sampled) study population should report (unconditional) prediction intervals for the causal 
risk difference as ~RD + 1.96 V~r A (cRD) and for the causal risk difference in the exposed as given 
in equation (4). 
3(D). Confounding for Superpopulation Parameters 
In this subsection we suppose that (1) the study population has been randomly sampled from 
a near infinite superpopulation, (2) the parameter of interest is a parameter of the superpopulation 
and (3) we could compute the value of the parameter of interest if we had data on E, C and D 
for all members of the superpopulation. We shall say that there is no confounding by a covariate 
C in the absence of data on C for the parameter of interest when there is no confounding in the 
superpopulation (i.e. when the superpopulation parameter of interest could be computed from data on 
E and D for each superpopulation member). Therefore, there is no confounding in the absence of 
data on C for the causal risk difference if cRD =/'2 - P3  = sRD in the superpopulation even when, 
due to chance exposure-covariate ssociations in the sample, the crude risk difference in the data 
does not equal the (superpopulation) parameter of interest, i.e. ~RD :~/ '2-  P3 = sRD = cRD. 
Nonetheless, when there is no confounding for the causal risk difference in the absence of data on 
C, E [~RD] = P2 - P3. In fact the above definition implies that C is a nonconfounder in the absence 
of data on C for the superpopulation parameter of interest (e.g. the causal risk difference)precisely 
when the crude estimator (e.g. ~RD) is locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased for that parameter; 
that is, if C is a nonconfounder in the absence of data on C, we can unbiasedly estimate 
(asymptotically) the parameter of interest in the absence of data on C. For reasons discussed in 
Section 4(A) and in Definition 3 of Appendix B we have only required the crude estimator to be 
locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased for the parameter of interest. [Henceforth, unless stated 
otherwise, the term "unbiased" will mean locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased. See 
Appendix B.] 
In the following section, we slightly modify this definition of confounding in the absence of data 
on C in order to allow for nonrandom sampling of the superpopulation as would occur, for example, 
in a matched case-control study. 
4. CONFOUNDING IN THE ABSENCE OF DATA ON C 
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we suppose that the study population has been sampled 
(although not necessarily randomly) from a superpopulation a d that the parameter of interest is 
a parameter of that superpopulation. [In order to justify binomial confidence intervals in 
experimental studies, the subjects entered in a randomized trial can be considered a random sample 
from a superpopulation i  which ORec = 1 for all covariates C.] 
In this section, we assume that data on the covariate C have not been recorded for data analysis. 
We define C to be a nonconfounder in the absence of data on C if and only if, given the available 
prior knowledge, the study design, and the sampling scheme, the superpopulation "parameter of 
interest" can be unbiasedly estimated from the crude data (i.e. the large sample xpectation of some 
crude estimator equals the population parameter of interest; see Definition 3 in Appendix B). We 
will require that the parameter of interest can be unbiasedly estimated whenever data on C are 
available, since otherwise the above definition would often be vacuous. 
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If a crude parameter is defined to be any population parameter that can be unbiasedly estimated 
from the crude data given the available prior knowledge, the study design and the sampling scheme 
(even if nonrandom), then C will be a nonconfounder in the absence of data on C if and only if 
the parameter of interest equals a crude parameter. 
4(A ). Parameters of Interest in Cumulative Incidence Follow-up Studies 
As in Section 3, we consider a study of the effect of a binary exposure factor (E, J~) on the risk 
of a disease in a large (super)population ver a specified follow-up period. Lost to follow-up and 
death from causes other than the disease of interest are assumed to be negligible. Each member 
of the population either does or does not have a factor C. For each individual, the levels of E and 
C remain constant over the follow-up period. (It follows that if exposure occurred exactly at start 
of follow-up, then C cannot be an intermediate variable on the causal pathway from exposure to 
disease.) We now consider the conditions under which C is a confounder for the effect parameter 
and study designs commonly used in epidemiologic research. 
First consider a follow-up study in which some fixed number of exposed and unexposed subjects 
are sampled at random from the superpopulation. I  Sections 2 and 3 we have considered 
conditions for confounding for the superpopulation causal risk difference in the exposed. Define 
O/EX to be the causal risk ratio in the exposed. In the absence of confounding for the stratum- 
specific ausal risk ratios in the exposed superpopulation [i.e. EXc, = p (D I ff,, Ci) for i e {0, 1 }], 




p(C IE)p (D Iff,, C) + p(CIE)p(D Iff~, C)" 
sMR = cRR =-p (D [E)/P (D I/~) if and only if, in the superpopulation, OREc = 1 or ORoclg = 1. 
Since the crude risk ratio estimator ~RR =ff (D I E)/P (D I/T) is locally uniformly asymptotically 
unbiased for cRR (although the exact expectation of ~RR is infinite), these conditions for no 
confounding for the sMR are the same as those for the sMD. Throughout the remainder of the 
paper, we concentrate on the sMR rather than the sMD as the parameter of interest because the 
sMR, in contrast o the sMD, can be estimated from case-control data under the rare disease 
assumption. 
4(B). Odds Ratios and Case-control Studies 
In both case-control and follow-up studies epidemiologists commonly report stratum-specific 
odds ratios as effect parameters. In case-control studies, this reflects the fact that risk ratios and 
differences cannot be estimated without knowledge of the control sampling fraction. In follow-up 
studies, this reflects the recent popularity of logistic regression models. In case-control studies, the 
internally standardized o ds ratio, sOR [10], is often chosen as a summary measure of interest when 
the exposure disease odds ratio is not constant across levels of C, where 
sOR = p (E I D) 
p(EID, C) ~, p (E J/3, C)" 
p(/~, CID)p(E ID, C)+p(E, C I L,)p (/~ i/~, ~) 
sOR is a weighted average of the stratum specific odds ratios. In an unmatched case-control study, 
C is a nonconfounder for the sOR (or for a common odds ratio) if and only if C is not a risk factor 
in the unexposed or E and C are unassociated in those nondiseased at end of follow-up since. 
sOR=cOR if and only if ORecl6=l or ORocl~=l 
(where, for example, cOR is the crude exposure disease odds ratio in the super population). Here 
we have used the fact that in an unmatched case control study C'OR, the empirical crude odds ratio 
estimator, is asymptotically unbiased for cOR. Note if C is a risk factor in the unexposed and 
ORec -- 1, then OREct~ # 1, and thus C will be a confounder for the sOR or for a common odds 
ratio. 
If the disease is rare sOR ~, sMR [10] (where in this paper the use of the expressions "the disease 
is rare" or "under the rare disease assumption" always implies that at each joint level of E and 
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C, the cumulative incidence of disease over the entire follow-up period is small). Since the sOR, 
in contrast o the sMR, has no clear-cut epidemiologic meaning, we concur with Miettinen and 
Cook in their implicit rejection of the sOR as the parameter of interest when the disease is not 
rare. If the disease is rare, then whenever E and C are unassociated in the population (ORec = 1), 
E and C will be nearly unassociated among those nondiseased at the end of follow-up (i.e. 
ORecl~ ~ 1). Thus in unmatched cumulative incidence studies in which the sMR is parameter 
of interest, and C is at 2 levels, C is a nonconfounder in the absence of data on C in either 
case-control studies (under the rare disease assumption) or in follow-up studies if and only if C 
is not a risk factor for disease in the unexposed (ORoctg = 1) or E and C are unassociated in the 
superpopulation. These are well known results [11]. 
In a matched case-control study in which controls are matched to cases on level of C, if C is 
not a risk factor for disease among the unexposed but E and C are associated among the 
nondiseased in the population then even if the disease is rare, sOR = cOR # CORmatch~ where 
CORrnatched is the crude parameter estimated by the crude OR estimator from matched ata [1] (cOR 
is the superpopulation crude odds ratio and is the crude parameter estimated by ~OR in an 
unmatched study); thus the parameter of interest, sOR, does not equal the crude parameter defined 
by the sampling scheme. Therefore C is a confounder for the sOR in the absence of data on C 
(that is, when C status is not recorded for data analysis) in such a matched study and inference 
on sOR cannot be performed from the crude data. 
In general, the decision not to measure a covariate C in an observational (i.e. nonexperimental) 
study with sMR as parameter of interest requires an investigator to have prior knowledge that C 
is a causal nonconfounder absent data on C (or at least prior knowledge that the discrepancy 
between cRR and sMR is biologically unimportant). If C is at more than 2 levels or continuous, 
then it is possible that cOR = sOR or cRR = sMR (and thus C is a nonconfounder for the sOR 
or sMR) even if C is both a risk factor for disease in the unexposed, and E and C are associated 
in the population, provided the population associations between C, E and D satisfy certain complex 
restrictions (see Section 7). Although of theoretical interest, in practise an investigator would be 
very unlikely to have prior knowledge about such a complicated association. On the other hand, 
prior knowledge that C is not a risk factor for disease, (e.g. C is preferred shirt color) or not related 
to certain environmental exposures (e.g. C is a genetic risk factor) is commonplace. 
4(C). Cumulative Incidence Case-control Study of a Common Disease with the Overall Probability 
of Disease Known or Estimable 
Suppose the disease is not rare and therefore OREcig~ORec and sMR=~ sOR but the 
probability of disease in the target population is known a priori from other studies or the sampling 
fraction in cases and controls is known. Then sMR and cRR can still be unbiasedly estimated given 
data on C from case-control data using Bayes rule [12]. Absent data on C, cRR can be estimated. 
Thus, sMR can be unbiasedly estimated if and only if cRR = sMR,~OREc = 1 or ORDctr = 1 is 
known a priori (i.e. the conditions for nonconfounding are the same as in a follow-up study). On 
the other hand, if the disease is not rare and neither the probability of disease nor the control 
sampling fraction is known, then, by our definition, the question of whether C is a confounder for 
the sMR is vacuous, since the sMR cannot be unbiasedly estimated even were data on C available. 
4(D ). Other Common Study Designs and Effect Parameters 
4(D ). 1. Incidence density ratio in a steady state population 
In a case-control study within a stable (steady state) population with the internally standardized 
incidence density ratio (sIDR) as parameter of interest, sOR = sIDR without the rare disease 
assumption [13]. In the absence of matching on C, ~OR is asymptotically unbiased for cOR. 
Therefore, the exposure-covariate condition for nonconfounding absent data on C (OReclt~ = 1) 
implies E and C are unassociated at all times in the population at risk without reference to 
any rare disease assumption. The disease covariate condition for nonconfounding is, as before, 
ORoctr = 1. These conditions for nonconfounding remain unchanged when the incidence density 
ratio is known to be constant over strata. 
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4(D).2. Incidence density ratio in fixed cohort studies 
Consider a fixed cohort study where time of disease onset is recorded and, within each level of 
C, the incidence density ratio (hazard ratio) is constant over time and levels of C. If  C is not a 
risk factor for disease in the population, C is a nonconfounder for the incidence density ratio (IDR) 
absent data on C (since IDR = clDR) in both a follow-up and time-matched case-control study 
without need for the rare disease assumption [14], where clDR is the crude hazard ratio. In a 
time-matched case-control study the controls associated with a given case are sampled from 
individuals at risk at the time of disease onset of the case. But if C is a risk factor, then even when 
E and C are unassociated in the population at the start of follow-up, if the disease is not rare, the 
E-C association changes over time, c lDR is not constant over time, and clDR ~ IDR; thus 
surprisingly C would effectively be a confounder for the IDR in the absence of data on C in both 
a follow-up and a time-matched case-control study. 
The above result concerning the IDR is made less disturbing when it is recognized that even in 
a randomized trial the IDR often fails to have a causal interpretation and thus C is not a 
confounder for a causal parameter. For example, in a hypothetical study of individuals randomized 
at age 20 to either cigarette smoking or no cigarette smoking, it is quite possible that although 
smoking may shorten each individual's life span, the 65 y old smokers reflect a (survivor) 
population of relatively resistant individuals with greater life expectancy than 65 y old nonsmokers. 
As an extreme xample it might be that individuals can only get lung cancer if they possess a 
(unmeasured) genetic allele X, that all smokers who possessed allele X have died by age 65, but 
some 65 y old nonsmokers with allele X are still living. Thus, the comparison of lung cancer 
incidence in smokers and nonsmokers at age 65 is not causal since it fails to control for the risk 
factor-allele X, even though in a large trial allele Xwas almost certainly balanced by randomization 
at start of follow-up. Since a similar lack of comparability on X will arise within each stratum of 
a dichotomous measured covariate C, the stratum-specific IDR will, in general, also fail to have 
a causal interpretation. 
The above suggests that, as is common practice in the randomized trial literature, causal 
parameters should be defined in terms of cumulative incidences rather than in terms of incidence 
densities (or conditional survivals). If so, then if E and C are unassociated in the population at 
start of follow-up, C will be a nonconfounder absent data on C for parameters such as the sMR, 
which depend only on the cumulative incidence. Note that one should, in general, compare the 
cumulative incidence of disease in exposed and unexposed individuals at all times after start of 
follow-up and not just at end of follow-up (i.e. one should compare ntire mortality or survival 
curves). 
More formally, in a deterministic model, we say that the clDR at time t is confounded if it fails 
to equal the causal parameter defined as the limit as At ~ 0 of l/At times the causal risk ratio with 
follow-up through t + At for the subset of study subjects who would survive to t regardless of 
exposure. This causal parameter would equal the clDR at t in a large randomized trial (so that 
there is no confounding at start of follow-up) if (1) the conditional probability of death among 
exposed subjects between t and t + At equals the same conditional probability among the subset 
of exposed subjects who would survive to t both when exposed and unexposed, and (2) condition 
(1) holds with "unexposed" replacing "exposed". Condition (2) fails in the above example, since, 
although some unexposed subjects alive at 65 have allele X, no unexposed subject alive at 65 both 
has allele X and would be alive at 65 if exposed to cigarettes. 
5. CONFOUNDING GIVEN DATA ON C 
5(A). Definition of Confounding Given Data on C 
In this section we consider the implications for statistical inference on the causal parameter of 
interest of discovering, when we have collected ata on C, that the associations of C with exposure 
and/or disease in our sample differ from those associations known to hold in the superpopulation. 
As usual, we assume that the parameter of interest can be unbiasedly estimated from data on 
E, C and D. 
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In the most comprehensive article on confounding to date, Miettinen and Cook develop "first 
principles" of confounding based on inductive, intuitive considerations of various examples [1]. In 
that paper, Miettinen and Cook state that "confounding implies a need and desire to replace the 
'crude' estimate of the effect by one that has been adjusted for the covariate at issue". Implicit in 
this definition is the assumption that data on the covariate have been recorded for data analysis 
so that an estimate adjusted for the covariate can be computed. 
As an example, suppose in a follow-up study that, by chance, an E-C association exists in the 
study data even though it is known a priori that no E-C association exists in the superpopulation. 
Then if, in the data, C is a risk factor in the unexposed, the crude and stratified estimate of the 
sMR will differ. Miettinen and Cook (see principle 3 in Section 1) regard the stratified estimate 
as appropriate. They regard the crude estimate as being confounded and in need of adjustment 
even though, as we have seen in Section 4, because there is no population E-C association, the 
crude estimator is a valid unbiased estimator of the sMR in the absence of data on C. 
In accord with Miettinen and Cook, we define C to be a point estimate nonconfounder in the 
data at hand, if and only if the crude estimate of the parameter of interest equals the observed 
value of an appropriate adjusted estimator. Miettinen and Cook fail to give a general definition 
of an appropriate adjusted estimate. We formally define an appropriate estimator to be an efficient 
Fisher* consistent estimator. We demonstrate hat the requirement that appropriate estimators* 
be efficient* estimators i necessary, in general, to reach Miettinen and Cook's intuitive inductive 
decisions. (Heuristic definitions of statistical terms marked with an asterisk are given in Appendix 
B.) Because we call for a comparison of the crude estimate with an appropriate estimate in the 
data at hand, it may appear that our definition of confounding is similar to earlier purely 
data-driven definitions. This is in fact not the case because, as shown in Examples A and B below, 
efficient estimators explicitly incorporate any prior knowledge that the investigator may have 
concerning the population parameters. The need for Fisher consistency is discussed in Section 
5(P). 
The position that the intuitive epidemiological concept of confounding depends on efficiency 
considerations is quite heretical. Many epidemiologists seem to assume that a crude estimate is
confounded by a covariate C if the crude estimate does not equal the observed value of any 
"intuitively unbiased" estimator in the data at hand [1, 10, 15, 16]. For example, Miettinen and 
Cook [1] describe the "confounding bias" of a crude estimate. Estimators are "intuitively unbiased" 
if they can serve as the center of a large-sample* confidence interval* for the parameter of interest 
(i.e. if they are locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased*). In this paper an estimator will be 
referred to as biased if and only if it cannot center large-sample confidence intervals (CI). By 
introducing a new statistical concept into epidemiology--approximate ancillarity [5]--we can view 
those estimators requiring adjustment (inefficient estimators) to be biased in repeated trials, 
conditional on the observed values of any approximate ancillary statistics. Approximate ancillaries 
measure the degree to which associations observed in the data differ due to sampling variability from 
our a priori knowledge of the corresponding population associations. Thus, appropriate stimators can 
be defined either as unconditionally efficient or as unbiased conditional on the observed values of all 
approximate ancillary statistics. 
Miettinen and Cook only concern themselves with the issue of whether the crude point estimate 
of effect is appropriate. But frequentist inference concerning a parameter of interest is best 
summarized in a confidence interval*. We therefore define C to be a confidence interval 
nonconfounder in the data at hand if and only if inference on the parameter of interest does not 
depend on the data through C, i.e. if and only if the observed crude confidence interval equals an 
appropriate observed confidence interval*. An appropriate confidence interval can be constructed 
from a conditionally unbiased (i.e. appropriate) stimator and a conditionally unbiased estimator 
of the estimator's conditional standard error. In this paper, confounding when not preceded by 
"CI", will refer to point estimate confounding. We show in Example F that ignoring C in the 
analysis when the crude point estimate quals an appropriate stimate, but the observed crude 
confidence interval is inappropriate, may lead to serious misinterpretations of the data. Further- 
more, if large-sample confidence intervals and tests (p-values) are of interest in addition to point 
estimates, a unified approach would require that CI confounding (in contrast o point estimate 
confounding) by viewed (as in the above definition) in terms of bias conditional on approximate 
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ancillary statistics rather than in terms of unconditional efficiency. In particular, in Example C 
below, we show that an approach based on unconditional efficiency can lead to the reporting of 
inappropriate confidence intervals. 
Furthermore, in Example C, we will show that even if, based on prior knowledge, C is a 
nonconfounder in the absence of data on C, if data on C (and therefore on an approximate 
ancillary) subsequently become available, C can become a confounder. Confounding, as we have 
defined it, thus depends not only on the available prior knowledge, but also on the available data. 
In fact in Section 5(G) we demonstrate hat, when data on C are unavailable, the definition of 
confounding iven in this subsection reduces to the definition of confounding in the absence of 
data on C as given in Section 4. 
Any statistical interpretation of confounding in terms of intuitive (i.e. asymptotic) bias must, by 
definition, be based on large-sample* (i.e. asymptotic) theory. In this section, our interest is in 
offering a statistical interpretation of the epidemiologist's intuitive concept of confounding. 
An "exact" theory of confounding applicable to small samples or sparse data* is developed in 
Section 6. 
5(B). Prior Knowledge vs Prior Belief 
Central to this paper is the explicit incorporation i to our inference of prior knowledge of various 
population parameters. Prior knowledge must be carefully distinguished from prior belief. Prior 
knowledge will refer to correct knowledge concerning a state of nature (i.e. a population parameter) 
obtained from outside the study. It need not be prior temporally. It may be derived from previous 
empirical studies, from biological theories, or from previous actual physical randomization. The 
decision as to what prior knowledge xists in a given study is (except in the case of randomization) 
a "subject matter" issue [1], and depends on the knowledge of the investigator. 
Although Bayesian statistical inference xplicitly incorporates prior information, in this paper 
we largely restrict ourselves to inference based on outcomes in hypothetical repeat rials (frequentist 
inference), since frequentist confidence intervals are the present standard method of reporting 
epidemiologic results. Bayesian inference, in which all parameters are assumed to have prior 
probability distributions, overcomes the need for our prior information to be correct concerning 
a state of nature, by defining probability as the subjective beliefs of an individual. Frequentist 
inference based on confidence intervals, on the other hand, requires that prior knowledge 
about nature used in constructing confidence intervals be correct. Since, in frequentist statistics, 
population parameters are considered fixed unknown constants and not random variables (with 
the exceptions of empirical Bayes and random effects models), the concept of a prior (nonpersonal) 
probability distribution for a parameter does not make sense. For example, we might have prior 
knowledge that a parameter lies in an interval (2,4) but not that its prior probability distribution 
(as a fact of nature) is uniform on (2,4). 
To make explicit the above distinction between prior belief of an individual and correct prior 
knowledge concerning nature consider outine data analysis in regression packages incorporating 
backward elimination (see Ref. [17]). In such analyses a test is performed to determine whether 
an estimate of the covariate's parameter (i.e. coefficient) differs significantly from zero. If not, the 
parameter is set to zero; otherwise, it is set equal to its estimate from the full model. An investigator 
using such a package has in effect a personal prior probability distribution for the covariate's 
parameter that assumes the parameter is probably near zero, but allows a small probability that 
the parameter may take on any value. Thus such an investigator does not have prior knowledge 
since all parameter values are considered possible. If the investigator believed that the value of the 
covariate's parameter was more likely 10 than 0, he or she presumably would have tested to see 
whether the estimate differs significantly from 10, and, if not, set the parameter to 10. 
Once the parameter is set to zero by the backward elimination program, it is then handled in 
the subsequent analysis as if the investigator had prior knowledge that the parameter was zero. 
For example, using the model with the covariate's parameter set to zero the confidence interval 
for the exposure parameter of interest will cover the true parameter of interest 95% of the time 
only if in fact the covariate's parameter is zero. A 95% confidence interval, by definition, must 
cover the true parameter 95% of the time for all possible value of the other parameters, but if the 
covariate is eliminated, zero is considered the only possible values for the covariate's coefficient. 
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How can a test lead from a prior belief that a parameter can take on any value to absolute 
knowledge it is zero? Obviously, it cannot. For example, such a test may have little power to detect 
a true value of two for the covariate's parameter. Only true prior knowledge rather than prior belief 
is the basis for ignoring covariates in construction of confidence intervals. 
The usefulness of backward elimination procedures i for point estimation, not for confidence 
intervals. For example, if one's prior beliefs are nearly correct, then the backward elimination 
estimator, although in general biased [see Section 8(E)], will yield a smaller mean square error (i.e. 
be closer on average to the true parameter) in small and moderate sized samples than the estimator 
from the full model, and will do only slightly worse than the full model estimator if one's prior 
beliefs were mistaken. But biased estimators cannot be used to center confidence intervals. 
It may be argued that we never have prior knowledge, but only prior beliefs, i.e. extreme data 
results will always make us revise our "prior knowledge" and thus our "knowledge" was actually 
only strong belief. If so, in purely frequentist framework, we could never exclude any of the often 
numerous measured covariates from the analysis for the construction of confidence intervals, and 
we would thus have no power to detect biologically relevant alternatives tothe null. For the present, 
we will assume that those prior beliefs used in data analysis are of sufficient strength that, given 
the sample size of our study, no outcome (no matter how extreme), would make us revise those 
beliefs to any large degree. Thus the investigator acts inferentially as if in the possession of true 
prior knowledge. (This latter assumption is relaxed in Robins and Greenland [17].) Similarly, 
whenever an investigator chooses not to obtain data on a covariate in an observational study, the 
investigator acts inferentially as if in the possession of true prior knowledge that the covariate is 
a nonconfounder absent data on C. A central theme of this paper is the implication for data 
analysis and study design of inference performed as if in the possession of prior knowledge. Note 
that, by our definition, C would be considered a confounder by a particular investigator even when, 
as a fact of nature, the crude estimator was unbiased, if that investigator lacked prior knowledge 
of the crude estimator's unbiasedness. Therefore, what we call a "confounder", others might choose 
to call a "potential confounder". 
5(C). Confounding as Efficiency 
Example A. Prior knowledge that C is not a risk factor in the population in a follow-up study 
Imagine C was a covariate representing social security number ending in 5 or greater vs t~ (4 
or less), and Table 2 was the raw data from a follow-up study of the effect of E on D with the 
sMR as the population parameter of interest. When considering follow-up (i.e. prospective) studies, 
the rows of Table 2 represent disease status and the columns exposure status. For case-control 
studies, the rows represent exposure status and the columns disease status. Most epidemiologists 
would assume apriori that social security number is not a risk factor for disease in the unexposed 
population, (i.e. ORDcl~ = 1) and suggest he collapsed analysis be used even though a D-C 
association exists in the data among the unexposed. (Miettinen and Cook's Appendix [1] that 
purports to demonstrate hat a covariate such as social security number could still be a confounder 
is not pertinent here, but is discussed in detail following Example C.) 
Since ORDclg = 1, sMR = cRR in the population. Thus both the crude ~RR and the usual 
stratified estimator (the unrestricted maximum likelihood estimator--fisMR) are unbiased for 
sMR. Note that ~sMR a0 =3 #cRR = 1 in these data because due to sampling variability 
uORoclE = 7 # ORoclt = 1. If we sampled the entire population, given that our prior knowledge 
is correct, this discrepancy could not occur. 
Why would many epidemiologists prefer ~RR to fisMR? Heuristically, in the absence of prior 
knowledge, the raw data give the "best unbiased estimates" (the unrestricted maximum likelihood 
Table 2 Table 3 
C C Total C C Total Case Case 
control D /) D /) D /) control D D D /) D /) 
Prospective E E E E E E Prospective E E E E E 
E D 20 20 10 10 30 30 E D 20 10 10 20 30 30 
/~ /) 60 20 30 70 90 90 E b 60 30 30 60 90 90 
Total 80 40 40 80 120 120 Total 80 40 40 80 120 120 
C.A,M.W.A. 14/9-12--P 
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estimator) of the unknown population proportions, and thus fisMR calculated from the raw data 
is the "best estimate" of sMR. But given prior knowledge ORoclg = 1 the raw data proportions 
are inconsistent with the known population proportions. Our "best unbiased estimate" of the 
population proportions (called the restricted maximum likelihood estimate) would instead be 
calculated from a fitted table (Table 3) that is as "close" to the observed ata as possible subject 
to the restriction ORocpg = 1 in the fitted table. ~sMR (the restricted maximum likelihood estimator 
of sMR) is the stratified estimate from the fitted table and is our "best" unbiased estimate of sMR 
given our prior knowledge ORnclE = 1. But for all data outcomes ~sMR = ~RR if ORnclg = 1, as 
exemplified in Table 3. From a formal statistical viewpoint, since both fisMR and ~sMR are 
unbiased and thus appropriate for centering confidence intervals, the choice of ~sMR over fisMR 
by epidemiologists must be based on efficiency considerations, i.e. the fact that the variance of 
~sMR is less than fisMR. 
~sMR has smaller variance than fisMR since unrestricted maximum likelihood estimation 
estimates all population parameters in the model simultaneously (e.g. fisMR, ~ORoclg, etc.). Each 
parameter that is estimated uses up some of the information in the data. In restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation, ORoclg is not estimated, but rather set equal to the true known value. Thus 
more data information, in general, is available for precise estimation of the parameter of interest. 
The usual (unrestricted) maximum likelihood estimator is, in general, efficient only in the absence 
of prior knowledge. Of course if our prior knowledge was incorrect, ~sMR is biased and thus 
inappropriate. 
Inefficient estimation is equivalent to ignoring informative aspects of the data. For instance, 
in Example A the difficulty with fisMR is that it estimates the probability of D given C and 
E [p (D I C, E)] as 20/40 based on only 40 observations, ignoring that the a priori knowledge 
p (D I C, E )=p (DIC, E) would allow estimation o fp  (D If, E) to be based on 120 observations. 
Thus the best estimate of p (DIC, E) is 30/120 [the restricted maximum likelihood estimator of 
p (DIC, E)], as in the fitted table. 
Example B. Confounding iven prior knowledge that C is a risk factor 
Our Example B will be a follow-up study equivalent to Miettinen and Cook's Example 2 [1] from 
their 1981 paper in which E is identified with tolbutamide, C with age (at two levels), and D with 
death from cardiac disease, except we assume that instead of a randomized trial, our data are a 
random sample from a large superpopulation with OREc ~ 1 and with sMR as parameter of 
interest. Following Miettinen and Cook, we assume that age is known a priori to be related to 
disease among the unexposed, where, for the sake of argument, we assume this relationship is 
known precisely to be ORDclg = 7. 
The data in Table 3 were observed. Note in Table 3, a positive E-C association exists in the 
data. Although ~RR is unconditionally biased since cRR # sMR (and thus C is a confounder in 
the absence of data on C), nevertheless, in the data at hand, the crude estimate quals the usual 
adjusted estimate, i.e. fisMR = ~RR = 1. But the fitted table using the prior knowledge that 
ORoclg = 7 is precisely Table 2. Therefore, [sMR --- 30/45. Now if our choice was [sMR over fisMR 
when ORoclg = 1 a priori, the same choice is required when ORoclg = 7 a priori. Thus, although 
we have no apparent confounding in the data, (i.e. fisMR = ~RR), ~RR = 1 must be adjusted to 
[sMR = 30/45. C is therefore a confounder in the presence of data on C, in agreement with 
Principle 2 of the Introduction. (The statistical package GLIM 3 [18] can often be used to calculate 
the restricted maximum likelihood estimator if the a priori known parameter is set equal to its 
known value in the model using the offset option.) 
In practice it is much more common to have exact prior knowledge that ORoclg = 1 as in 
Example A than ORDcig = 7. But often, as for age and heart disease, previous tudies often might 
show ORoclg lies within some interval, e.g. (3, 7). Given such an interval prior restriction, the ~sMR 
would be obtained from one of three possible fitted tables calculated as above, where, in the fitted 
table: 
(1) set ORnc1E = 3 if ~ORncjg < 3 in the data; 
(2) set ORnclE = 7 if fiORoclg > 7; 
(3) set ORncjg = fiORn~g if 3 ~< ~ORoclg <<, 7. 
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5(D ). Confounding as Bias Conditional on Approximate Ancillary Statistics 
How can decisions concerning confounding, e.g. the choice of ~sMR over fisMR in Examples 
A and B, be considered by some epidemiologists o be a bias rather than an efficiency issue? 
Consider Example B again, with ORoclz = 7 known a priori, but fiORoclE = 1; an unusual outcome 
has occurred. In repeated trials fisMR is unbiased for sMR, where such trials, of course, include 
trials in which fiORocl~- ORocl~ is greater as well as less than zero. 
But why should outcomes (such as fiORocl~- ORoclt > 0) that might have occurred, but did 
not occur in the actual study, influence our inference on sMR. Rather one might explicitly (as 
Miettinen and Cook do implicitly) restrict hemselves tothose subsets of all hypothetical repetitions 
in which the difference between the observed DC I E association and the known population DC I vL 
association is the same as in the actual study. Let A equal 
fiOR~clg- 7 
x/V~r (fiORoclg)' 
where the denominator is an estimate of the variance of fiORoclg and ORocig = 7 is known apriori. 
,4 is a standardized measure of the above difference, and is in large samples normally distributed 
with mean zero and variance one. Thus, X = -2  means that due to sampling variability, the 
observed data association is two standard deviations below its expected known value of 7. 
In hypothetical repetitions with .4 = -2  the observed proportion of unexposed subjects at level 
C who are diseased will systematically underestimate he corresponding population proportion, 
and likewise the observed proportion of unexposed subjects at level t~ who are diseased will 
systematically overestimate he corresponding population proportion. Algebra then shows that if 
there exists a positive E-C association, then fisMR systematically overestimates sMR (as Miettinen 
and Cook suggest). Thus although fisMR is unbiased over all the hypothetical trials, it is biased 
over the set of trials where ,,T = - 2 and is unsuitable for centering conditional confidence intervals, 
even though fisMR remains consistent* conditional on ,4 = -2 .  
A statistic such as ,4 which in large samples is N(0, 1) and thus whose asymptotic distribution 
does not depend on unknown parameters, is called an approximate ancillary [5]. To observe 
required both prior knowledge that ORoclg = 7 and data on fiORocl~ (i.e. data on C). 
Conditional on approximate ancillaries, unconditional inefficient estimators are, in general, 
biased, while efficient estimators such as ?sMR are unbiased [see Section 8(B)]. Thus confounding 
in the presence of prior knowledge can be viewed either as an efficiency issue over all hypothetical 
repetitions or as bias if hypothetical repetitions are restricted to those with the same value of ,~ 
as the observed ata. In fact fisMR and ?sMR have identical variance over the sets of trials where 
= -2  [see Section 8(B)]. Thus conditionally it is only bias that distinguishes the statistical 
properties of fisMR from ?sMR. 
Epidemiologists ( uch as Miettinen and Cook) who interpret confounding as a form of bias are 
implicitly imagining the same study repeated over and over again with the same outlier in terms 
of the DCIE association, and realize the "experiment" is biased. Until recently statisticians had 
not considered approximate ancillarity [5]. In fact .4 is not even a function of the minimal sufficient 
statistic*, so it is no wonder statisticians did not consider conditional inference in Example B [see 
Section 8(D)]. 
5(E). Conditional Precision and the Need for the Concept of Ancillarity 
Approximate ancillarity is an extension of the concept of exact ancillarity. To appreciate why 
the concept of conditioning on an ancillary statistic (introduced by Fisher [19]) is essential to 
frequentist statistics, consider the following problem adapted from Cox and Hinkley [20]: a fair 
coin is flipped. If heads is observed, a micrometer is used to measure an object of interest; if tails, 
a yardstick is used. The micrometer has a variance of 1 mm z. The yardstick has a variance of 
400 mm ~. The coin is flipped; heads appears; the micrometer is used; and the measurement is 
50 mm. 
Is the rod significantly longer than 45 mm? If we calculate the standard deviation of the 
measurement over the hypothetical repetitions of the entire experiment including the flip of the 
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coin, then the standard eviation is 
~ 14.1 ram, 
since the yardstick is used 1/2 of the time. And thus 50 mm is well within 2 standard eviations 
of 45 ram. If we calculate the standard eviation over hypothetical repetitions conditional on 
obtaining heads and measuring with the micrometer in each trial, then the standard eviation is 
1 mm, and the rod is deemed significantly longer than 45 mm. Common sense demands that we 
condition, since the fact that a different measuring instrument could have been used but was not 
seems irrelevant to the interpretation f the measurement. Thus we are conditioning on heads, the 
observed value of the coin toss in the experiment. The outcome heads is the ancillary statistic. 
Note the similarities to our approximate ancillary. The probability of getting heads, like the 
probability of A = -2 ,  does not depend on the parameter of interest. The observed heads tells us 
on which side of the average xpected outcome our data lie--i.e, to the heads side of the two 
possible coin outcomes--similar to A. The only difference is that heads is an exact ancillary since 
the probability of observing heads does not depend on the parameter of interest even in small 
samples, while ,4 is only an approximate ancillary, since its distribution is independent of the 
parameter of interest only in large samples. In summary if the standard error of the restricted 
maximum likelihood estimator conditional on an ancillary differs from the unconditional standard 
error, conditional inference is required. The restricted maximum likelihood estimator isessentially 
identical conditionally and unconditionally. 
In Examples A and B, the standard error of ~sMR is the same unconditionally and conditional 
on ,~. Thus it is a matter of philosophical preference whether one views the choice of ~sMR over 
fisMR for unconditional efficiency considerations or conditional bias considerations since for 
large-sample t sts and confidence intervals itmakes no difference. Most statisticians philosophically 
prefer eduction of the data to the minimal sufficient statistic*, and thus choose the efficiency point 
of view. 
In Example C below, the unconditional standard error of the restricted maximum likelihood 
estimator differs from the standard error conditional on the approximate ancillary, and thus 
conditioning on the approximate ancillary is essential (as in our measurement example above), if 
tests or confidence intervals are of interest [see Section 8(D)]. Thus bias conditional on approximate 
ancillaries, unlike unconditional efficiency, can provide a single unified approach to confidence 
interval confounding. Furthermore, the estimated variance of the restricted maximum likelihood 
estimator conditional on any approximate ancillary is obtained from the inverse of the observed 
information matrix, while the estimated unconditional variance is obtained from the inverse of the 
estimated expected information [5]. Technically these results refer to large sample inference accurate 
to order N -3/2 in variance [see Section 8(C)]. The observed information is the matrix of second 
partial derivatives of the log likelihood evaluated at the restricted maximum likelihood estimator. 
The estimated expected information is the unconditional expectation of the matrix of second 
derivatives of the log-likelihood evaluated at the restricted maximum likelihood estimator. Thus, 
the appropriate 95% confidence intervals mentioned in Section 5(A) are to be formed from 
~sMR + 1.96 times the standard error derived from observed information. If an investigator reports 
the restricted maximum likelihood estimator and its estimated variance obtained from the observed 
information matrix, then the crude estimate and observed crude confidence interval will be 
automatically reported where appropriate and not otherwise. 
5(F). Confounding in a Follow-up Study Given No E -C  Association in the Population 
Example C 
Consider crude data from a follow-up study (Table 4) in which 120 exposed and unexposed 
individuals were randomly sampled from a near infinite target population with sMR as parameter 
of interest. E and C are known to be unassociated in the target population and C is a suspected 
risk factor for disease. Since ORrc = 1, cRR equals sMR. Therefore, ~RR = 24/42 is appropriate 
for inference on sMR absent data on C, We now show that even though absent data on C one 
has performed perfectly valid inference based on ~RR and its crude confidence interval, this 
inference is inadequate when additional data on C become available. 
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Table 4 Table 5 
E g C t~ Total 
D 24 42 E g E g E g 
/~ 96 78 D 4 2 20 40 24 42 
Total 120 120 /~ 76 38 20 40 96 78 
Total 80 40 40 80 120 120 
Assume after results based on ~RR are published, a colleague provides data on C that had been 
collected from the study subjects at the time of the study but not coded onto the original data tapes. 
The complete data is given in Table 5. 
Note that prior information on the E-C association i  the target population does not influence 
the estimate of the stratum specific risk ratios and thus 
~RRc = ~RRe = 1 = fiRRc = fiRR~ 
and therefore 
~sMR = 1. 
Nevertheless, ~sMR # ERR because by a sampling fluke a large E-C association exists in the data 
(fiORec = 4). If the entire target population had been sampled, this discrepancy would not have 
occurred. In general, if C is a risk factor, the variability of ~sMR in large samples is less than that 
of ~RR (see Theorem 2 in Appendix C), and thus we choose ~sMR over ~RR for reasons of 
efficiency. 
In addition 
/~ = f iORrc-  1 
V~r(fiOREc) 
is an approximate ancillary that measures the strength of the E-C association in the data. ~RR 
is biased conditional on/~ while ~sMR is unbiased (see Appendix C) and thus we also choose ~sMR 
over ~RR in general for reasons of conditional bias. Furthermore unlike in Examples A and B, 
the variance of the appropriate adjusted estimator ~sMR differs depending on whether it is 
calculated over all hypothetical repetitions or only over those with the same value of B [see Section 
8(C)]. By the previous discussion of ancillarity, the conditional variance (derived from the observed 
information) is required for confidence interval construction. If we viewed confounding as only a 
matter of unconditional efficiency, and thus used the unconditional standard error of ~sMR, 
confidence intervals for sMR would not depend on the E-C association i the data. This is in direct 
contrast o our intuition. For example, if the observed rates of disease at each joint level of E and 
C remained unchanged but the E-C association had been even more marked than in Table 5, e.g. 
the number of individuals who were C/~ or Eft' had been 8, say, rather than 40, it is intuitively 
clear and confirmed using the observed information (the estimator of the conditional standard 
error) that our estimates of p (D IC,/~), p (D I C, E), and sMR would be less precise. 
If no E-C association had existed in the data (i.e. /~ = 0), then ~sMR = fisMR = ERR, and 
the crude estimator is appropriate for all data outcomes for which B = 0. But the variance 
of ~RR must be calculated conditionally because in general when C is a risk factor, 
Var (~RRI/~ = 0) = Var (~sMRI/~ = 0) < Var~RR (see Theorem 2 in Appendix C). Thus the usual 
crude confidence interval based on V~r~RR will give falsely wide conditional confidence intervals, 
i.e., the confidence interval will cover the true parameter over 95% of the time in repeat rials in 
which/~ = 0. Thus once data on C have been acquired, our inference must be based on ~sMR and 
its conditional standard error. 
5(G). Confounding in the Absence of Data on C Revisited 
Even when we have prior knowledge of the association of C with E or D in the population, if
data on C are unavailable, we cannot observe the degree to which the association of C with E or 
D in the data differs from the known population association. In other words, the value of the 
approximate ancillary associated with the available prior knowledge will be unobserved. Thus, 
absent data on C, our definition of confounding iven in Section 5(A) becomes "C will be a 
nonconfounder in the data at hand if and only if the crude estimate quals the observed value of 
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an unconditionally unbiased estimator for the parameter of interest". But absent data on C, the 
only possible candidate for that unbiased estimator is the crude estimator itself. Thus, absent data 
on C, C will be a nonconfounder in the data at hand if and only if C is a nonconfounder for all 
possible data outcomes, i.e., the crude estimator is unconditionally unbiased. But this is exactly the 
definition of confounding in the absence of data on C given in Section 4. In this case, the crude 
confidence interval will be appropriate as well, and furthermore the crude estimator will be the 
efficient estimator based on the observed ata. 
5(H). A Critique of Conditioning on Unobserved Ancillaries 
Some epidemiologists [1], in disagreement with our approach, implicitly suggest that a proper 
approach to confounding requires that we consider, at least hypothetically, conditioning on 
unobserved approximate ancillaries. We will show Miettlnen and Cook implicitly considered such 
an approach in their appendix. In this section we critique the idea of conditioning on unobserved 
ancillaries. In the next subsection we apply our critique to answer a question raised by Miettinen 
and Cook in their Appendix. An approach to confounding that conditions on unobserved ancillary 
statistics would interpret Example C as proof that given OREc = 1, C can still be a "confounder 
absent data on C". One was simply unable to assess the strength of this "confounding" by C until 
the data on C were observed. This would be a very unhelpful definition of "confounding in the 
absence of data on C", in that it tends to suggest hat inference on the sMR should not be 
performed from the crude data even if ORec = 1 is known a priori, since, if C was not observed, 
it is always possible that unknown to the investigator a strong E-C association might exist in the 
data. The validity of all randomized trials would then dissolve. A better point of view is to realize 
that given ORec = 1, the price we pay for not observing C and thus ~ is reflected in the increased 
length on average of the crude confidence interval compared to that of the stratified confidence 
interval based on ~sMR. The greater length of the crude confidence interval reflects precisely our 
additional uncertainty about sMR because, unknown to us, a strong E-C association might exist 
in the data. In fact, asymptotically 
Var(~RR) = Var[E (~RR - cRR I/t)] + E [Var~RR I B], 
where E (~RR-  cRRIB) is the asymptotic conditional bias of ~RR due to the unknown E-C 
association in the data represented by B. The above formula demonstrates that uncertainty 
concerning the magnitude of the conditional bias of ~RR explicitly contributes to the variability 
of ~RR around sMR. When we report a crude estimate, we know from the outset hat in 5% of 
samples our estimate is far from sMR (i.e. more than 2 standard errors) due in part to data sets 
with a strong but unobserved E-C association. But even so, absent data on C, we have neither 
the "need nor desire" to adjust ~RR, for absent data on B in which direction would we adjust it? 
Instead if, as we recommend, one considers conditioning only on observed ancillaries, then 
absent data on C and therefore on/~ as well, we have no ancillary to condition on. Thus, absent 
data on C but given ORec = 1, ~RR is unbiased conditional on all observed ancillaries, and is 
therefore appropriate for all data outcomes. Alternatively, from the point of view of efficiency, ~RR 
is the efficient estimator absent data on C and thus is appropriate. But, given data on C, ~RR is 
both inefficient compared to ~sMR and biased conditional on/~. 
5(1). Resolution of a Question Posed by Miettinen and Cook in Their Appendix 
By using an argument analogous to that given in the last subsection, we demonstrate hat the 
concern expressed by Miettinen and Cook in Example B of their Appendix (that the restricted 
maximum likelihood estimator might, in some cases, not be the appropriate stimator) is 
unfounded, even when interest is in O/EX of the sampled population in the deterministic 
superpopulation model discussed in Section 3. In their Example B, Miettinen and Cook contend 
that in a follow-up study even if a covariate is known a priori not to be a risk factor in the 
unexposed (e.g. C as defined in Example A) it would be a confounder if by chance it is associated 
with the outcomes that would have been observed if all subjects had been unexposed. To see this, 
define approximate ancillaries, ,4~, 4: that measure the degree to which the DC association i the 
unexposed sample, and in the exposed sample when unexposed respectively in the data differs from 
its a priori known value of 1 in the superpopulation. To observe A2 we must observe the outcomes 
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Table 6 Table 7 
C C Total C ¢~ Total 
E g z g E g  e g E g e g  
D 1 4 2 4 3 8 D I 2 2 4 3 8 
B 
Total 8 8 4 4 12 12 Total 8 8 4 4 12 12 
of the exposed when unexposed. Although we can calculate zZT 1 given data on C, data on -42 will 
of course never be observed. We cannot condition on an unobserved ancillary statistic -42. 
Conditional on only ,4j, the observed ancillary, the unbiased efficient estimator is ERR as in 
Example A. The variance of ERR reflects in part our uncertainty about O/EX due to lack of 
knowledge of -42. Absent data on -42 we have neither the need nor desire to adjust ERR, for in 
which direction would we adjust it? Since ERR is appropriate, C is a nonconfounder given data 
on C (but absent data on the outcomes of the exposed when unexposed). 
5(J). The Failure of Miettinen and Cook's Principle 4 
In Example C, if the risk ratio was also known a priori to be constant over levels of C, then 
even if no E-C association exists in the data, ~RR (the restricted maximum likelihood estimator 
incorporating this further prior restriction) may not equal ERR. Although this contradicts 
Miettinen and Cook's principle that, if in a follow-up study no E-C association exists in the data, 
then C is not a confounder (Principle 4), Miettinen and Cook did not consider prior restrictions 
on the variability of the risk ratio over strata, but rather only on the DC I g and E-C associations. 
Nonetheless, Principle 4 still fails even within the class of restrictions they considered. For example, 
given the data from a follow-up study in Table 6, ERR = 3/8, and no E-C association exists in 
the data. Nevertheless given the prior knowledge RRDcIg = 2/8, the fitted table is Table 7. 
Therefore, ~sMR = (1/2) ~ (3/8) = ERR. 
Since we feel use of the restricted maximum likelihood estimator as the appropriate stimator 
is both necessary for a unified and consistent approach to confounding iven data on C, and is 
implicit in the Miettinen and Cook approach, Principle 4 should be abandoned. (In the above 
example if our prior knowledge was in terms of ORocig rather than RRocl~, then ERR = ~sMR 
whenever no E-C association exists in the data.) 
Principles 1-4 do not consider the implications of simultaneous prior knowledge that ORoclg = 1 
and ORec = 1 in a follow-up study. If an E-C association exists in the data, ERR :~ ~sMR, where 
~sMR is the restricted maximum likelihood estimator incorporating both restrictions, and thus C 
is a confounder in the presence of data on C. Nonetheless, in contrast to Examples B and C above, 
the absolute but not relative magnitudes of the confounding (i.e. the difference between ERR and 
~sMR) in the above counterexamples to Principles 1 and 4 remain bounded for all data outcomes. 
Furthermore, without substantial calculation, even the direction of the bias is not apparent. 
Therefore, the intuition of Miettinen and Cook had some basis for overlooking such counter- 
examples. 
5(K). Mean Square Error, Confidence Intervals and Confounding 
Example C also provides a clear demonstration that in Miettinen and Cook's as well as our own 
view of confounding, appropriate stimators are estimators that, given the available prior 
knowledge, can center large-sample conditional confidence intervals (i.e. conditionally unbiased 
estimators) irrespective of whether an investigator with particular prior beliefs might prefer a 
different confounded estimator for a decision problem based on mean square error loss. 
Suppose in Example C, C was a covariate about which the investigator held the prior belief that 
RRoclE was probably in the interval (1.01, 1.1) but might possibly lie outside that interval, and 
suppose also the risk ratio was known to be constant over levels of C. Although in large samples 
the conditional mean square error of ~RR is usually less than the conditional mean square error 
of the conditionally biased ERR, nevertheless for data sets with a strong chance E-C association, 
ERR will be closer on average to the true risk ratio (i.e. have smaller mean square error) than will 
~RR if in fact 1.01 < RRoclg < 1.1 where the average is computed over hypothetical repetitions in 
which either the E-C margin or B is fixed at its observed values. This result will not hold if RRoclg 
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lies far outside the interval. Thus for point estimation, an investigator with the above prior beliefs 
would select the confounded (i.e. conditionally biased) ~RR over ~RR. 
Furthermore ven for the investigator interested in mean square error loss in light of his prior 
beliefs, the restricted maximum likelihood estimator treating 1.01 ~< RRoctg < 1.1 as known a priori 
would probably be preferred over either ~RR or ~RR, although it, too, like the ~RR is 
inappropriate for centering confidence intervals in the absence of true prior knowledge that RRoclg 
lies in the above interval. 
5(L ). Case-control Studies Given Data on C 
Example D. Steady state incidence density case-control study 
Consider the case-control data in Table 2 where incident cases and controls have been sampled 
from a stable population with sIDR as the parameter of interest. 
If E and C are known a priori to be unassociated in those at risk, then OReclb = 1 and 
cOR = sIDR = sOR. Both the usual stratified estimator fisOR and ~OR unbiasedly estimate sIDR 
over all hypothetical repetitions. Yet 
20 + 10 21 
flsOR = 0/20\6,, ~-~) + 30 (10) = ~ :~ ~OR = 7 - 0
in the data at hand. Which is the appropriate stimator? 
The fitted table utilizing the information ORect~ = 1 is just Table 3. ~sOR calculated from Table 
3 equals ~OR. In fact ~sOR = ~OR for all possible data outcomes, and ~OR = ~sOR has variance 
strictly less than fisOR if C is a risk factor for disease (see Appendix D). Furthermore, conditional 
on 
= fiORzcl~- 1 
V~r (fiOReclo) 
(an approximate ancillary given ORecl~ = 1), if .~ # 0, fisOR is biased, while ~sOR = ~OR is 
unbiased. ~:OR remains the efficient estimator even if controls had been matched to cases on level 
of C. 
If prior knowledge that ORoctE = 1 rather than ORect~ = 1 was available, then again cOR = sOR 
and in an unmatched (but not in a matched) study ~OR = ~sOR. Thus, in both case-control and 
follow-up studies, it is prior knowledgerof the conditional independence of C and E or D (i.e. 
ORecl~ = 1 or ORocjz = 1) that justifies the crude analysis irrespective of associations in the data. 
Prior knowledge of the marginal independence of C and E (ORec = 1), as in Example C, requires 
a stratified analysis. 
If the odds ratio is known to be constant over strata, in small samples confidence intervals hould 
be exact and in sparse data point estimates should be based on the conditional (matched logistic) 
maximum likelihood estimator [21]. If either OREct~= 1 or OR~ct~ = 1, the exact confidence 
interval and conditional maximum likelihood estimator from the crude table derived by condi- 
tioning on the total number of exposed individuals in the study are superior in terms of confidence 
interval length and sampling variability respectively tothe exact confidence interval and conditional 
maximum likelihood estimator from the stratified analysis derived from conditioning on the full 
margins [see Section 6(C)]. 
Example E. Cumulative incidence case-control study given data on C 
If the data in Table 2 had arisen from a cumulative incidence type case-control study, any prior 
knowledge concerning a lack of an E-C association is usually of the form that E and C are 
unassociated in the source population (ORec = 1) rather than of the form ORect~ = 1. Nonetheless 
if ORec = 1 and if the disease is rare, then ORect~ ,,~ 1. Thus, although the available prior 
knowledge is ORec = 1, if the use of the approximation ORecl6 = 1 is valid, the above results for 
the sIDR demonstrate hat the crude analysis would be appropriate irrespective of associations 
observed in the data. Given data on C, if the disease is rare, the approximation OREcl6 = 1 can 
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be used when the number of controls ampled represents a small fraction of potential controls (e.g. 
controls are sampled from a near infinite population). 
The importance of this condition is illustrated by consideration of a case-control study within 
a cohort. Consider a double blind clinical trial involving 10,000 subjects followed for 3 y. The 
efficacy of a certain drug (C) was tested for its ability to prevent first occurrence of a disease (D). 
Subjects were randomized into treated (C) and placebo (C) groups so that each subject had a 33% 
chance of getting the drug. Unfortunately, the results howed that the drug significantly increased 
the risk of the disease. At the end of the trial, the investigators were told of a new hypothesis linking 
another exposure (E) with the same disease. To test this hypothesis n their study population, the 
investigators conducted a nested case control study, comparing all 120 observed cases of D with 
an equal number of noncases randomly sampled from the total cohort. Exposure histories were 
obtained from all 240 subjects (but no others), and the results are given in Table 2. 
Given ORec = 1, the ability to estimate the probability of disease in the population as 120/10,000 
allows valid estimation of cRR = sMR by Bayes theorem from both the crude data alone and the 
full data. This remains true regardless of the rarity of the disease [12]. [Given data on C, if the 
disease had not been rare (so that ORect~ ~ 1 even though OREc = 1), then ~sMR, the efficient 
estimator calculated via Bayes theorem that uses data on C, can differ substantially from either 
~OR or the crude estimator of cRR = sMR calculated from the crude data via Bayes theorem. 
Thus, C is a confounder given data on C, demonstrating that Principle 1 of the Introduction is 
false in this instance.] If, as in our data, the disease is rare and only a small fraction of potential 
controls have been sampled, then ~OR and its crude variance will be excellent approximations 
(although not exactly equal) to fsMR and its variance [see Section 6(F)], and inference based on 
the crude data is appropriate. 
To demonstrate his result, we note that if the disease is rare in the data, the controls to a good 
approximation may be considered a random sample from the entire population of 10,000. Although 
a strong E-C association exists in the nondiseased controls (~ORecl~= 7), a strong E-C 
association in a random sample from a randomized population provides no information on the 
unsampled individuals. To see this intuitively, imagine that the random sample is selected prior 
to randomization and furthermore that the sampled individuals are randomized to C or C by the 
flip of a coin an hour before the unsampled individuals. Thus with a high probability almost no 
E-C association exists in the 9760 unsampled potential controls, and thus almost no E-C 
association in the total group of 9880 potential controls (because 120 is such a small fraction of 
the total number of eligible controls). Although a test for no E-C association in the 120 
nondiseased controls rejects the null hypothesis at the p < 0.01 level, this is only evidence for a 
rare outcome under the null hypothesis; it is not evidence that the null hypothesis of almost no 
E-C association among the 9880 potential controls is false. Thus, ORecl~ = 1 is a much better 
estimate than OREcI~ = 7 of the association i the entire cohort of 10,000 and the appropriate fitted 
table is nearly Table 3. Therefore, ~sOR - ~OR. But ~sOR --- ~sMR if the disease is rare. 
On the other hand, if we take more controls per case, it is no longer necessarily true that 
~sMR---~OR. In the limit we would take all potential controls, and observe exactly the E-C 
association in the total population of 10,000 (i.e. we would have the precise equivalent of the full 
follow-up study). When all controls are sampled, with high probability no E-C association will 
be present in the 10,000 due to randomization. In such an event, given that the disease is rare, 
estimates and confidence intervals for sMR (or equivalently sOR) will be nearly the same in the 
stratified and collapsed analysis, e.g. ~sMR ~ ~OR - ~RR [see Section 6(E)]. But the one time in 
100,000,000,000 that chance randomization failure produced a large E-C association i  the 10,000, 
we find that [sMR ~ ~OR - ~RR. Since we have the equivalent of a follow-up study when all 
controls are sampled, the proper analysis in such an event is the stratified estimate, ~sMR, as in 
Example C above. 
5(M). Fixed Cohort Study with Incidence Density Ratio as Parameter of Interest Given Data on C 
If C is known a priori not to be a risk factor, then the most efficient estimator of the 
(stratum-specific) incidence density ratio (assumed constant over time and level of C) in follow-up 
or time- matched case control studies will depend only on the crude data, and so C will be a 
nonconfounder. If OREc = 1 is known a priori at start of follow-up and C is a risk factor, and if 
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the cumulative incidence of disease is not small, data on C, if available, will be used to efficiently 
estimate the incidence density ratio in both follow-up studies and time matched case-control 
studies. Thus C will be a confounder for the incidence density ratio given C in both the follow-up 
and case-control study, in conflict with Principle 1 of the Introduction. 
On the other hand in a time-matched case control study in which only a small fraction of 
potential controls have been sampled, if the cumulative incidence of disease at each joint level of 
E and C is small (and no significant nondisease r lated loss to follow-up occurs) over the study 
period, then given ORm = 1 in the superpopulation, ~OR and its associated crude confidence 
intervals obtained by collapsing over both time and level of C will to an excellent approximation 
give the appropriate adjusted point estimates and confidence intervals for the incidence density 
ratio. Thus C will not be a confounder for the incidence density ratio in a time-matched case control 
study if ORec = 1 at start of follow up is known a priori, the disease is rare, and a small fraction 
of potential controls has been sampled. 
5(N). Confounding Absent Prior Knowledge--the Failure of the Change in Estimate Criterion 
Example F. Cumulative incidence case-control study in the absence of prior knowledge 
We have justified the crude analysis in case-control studies when we had prior knowledge of 
either no E-CID or no D-Clff~ association i  the population irrespective of associations found 
in the data. Does the presence of "no confounding in the data" justify the crude analysis in the 
absence of prior knowledge? 
Consider the data in Table 8 obtained from a case-control study with OR known constant over 
strata. Note fiOR = ~OR = 4 because no disease-covariate ssociation exists in the data conditional 
on/~ (i.e. fiORoctg = 1), and the odds ratio is constant over strata in the data. 
Suppose we fit a logistic regression model with D as dependent variable: 
p(DIE, C) ] 
In l ~ p'~[E,,C)J = Bo + B,E + BcC, 
where E=I  if E, E=0 if E, C=I  if C, and C=0 if C; then Be=ln4=lnfiOReole and 
/~c = In 1 = In fiORocl~ = 0. 
Many authors consider this a case of "no confounding in the data" and suggest the collapsed 
analysis. The reasons generally stated for this view include: 
1. The estimate of the odds ratio does not change on collapsing or equivalently on 
dropping C from the logistic regression. 
2. In logistic regression, a variable with/~c = 0 should be dropped. 
3. If the null hypothesis Be = 0 is not rejected at the p < 0.05 level, drop C from the 
regression, i.e. perform backward elimination. 
Although the backward elimination has been widely criticized both earlier in this paper and 
elsewhere, the first and second reasons are still often advocated. 
Our object in epidemiologic studies is in general to find a point estimate of the parameter of 
interest and confidence interval. Miettinen and Cook's concept of confounding only discusses 
whether the crude point estimate of effect requires adjustment. In our example ~OR = fiOR so the 
crude estimate quals the appropriate stratified estimate in the data at hand (although not in all 
possible data outcomes), and thus does not require adjustment. 
However, the usual confidence interval for the odds ratio calculated from the collapsed table 
based on ln(~OR) is (1.43, 10.1), while the confidence interval from the stratified analysis, based 
on ln(fiOR) and its standard error, is (0.66, 23). Exact confidence intervals give similar results. 
Many data analysts look with pleasure on the improvement in precision (narrowing of the 
confidence interval) obtained by dropping the apparent "nonconfounder" C. An insignificant result 
has become significant, and thus we can publish a positive result by dropping such a non- 
confounder. 
But within sampling variation our data could have been sampled from a population with 
the expected values given in Table 9, where ORocl~ = 49/16, the common OR=OR~Dle = 1, 
cOR = (81/51) 2# the common OR. 
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Table 9 
C C Total 
Table 8 D /) D D D /) 
C (" Total 77 7 81 51 
D /~ D D D D E ~- 11 l 4 4 4 
E 20 10 2 1 22 11 g 7 77 51 81 
I 2 10 20 I1 22 ~, 1 ll 4 4 4 
Total 21 12 12 21 33 33 Total 21 12 12 21 33 33 
In fact if in the above D was lung cancer, C was mild cigarette smoking, and E was yellow fingers, 
we would infer from the collapsed analysis that yellow fingers is a risk factor for cancer. The 
stratified analysis correctly shows the data cannot discriminate between the effect of cigarettes and 
yellow fingers, since confidence intervals for both estimates include the null value [CI for ORoclg 
is (0.17, 5.9)]. Note that either E or C does determine D since, although neither Be nor Bc is 
significant in the presence of the other, the hypothesis that both Bc = 0 and Be = 0 is rejected at 
p < 0.01. This is a typical example of multi-collinearity in regression. E and C are highly correlated 
(fiOREct~ = 100) and thus the data are insufficient to distinguish their independent effects, although 
clearly one or the other or both have an effect. Only prior knowledge that the effect of either E 
or C is negligible can allow precise estimation of the other. Thus, dropping C from the model is 
equivalent to an a priori decision that C is not a risk factor for disease. In the absence of such 
knowledge, the stratified confidence intervals are telling us all that the data can tell us. 
The crude confidence interval gives a confidence interval for cOR. Thus it is not a confidence 
interval for the common odds ratio (the parameter of interest) unless cOR equals the common odds 
ratio. But cOR -- common OR if and only if OREo ~ = 1 or ORnclg = 1 in the population. Therefore 
we must ask "what is the evidence that ORrci~ = 1 or ORoctg = 17" if we wish to report the crude 
confidence interval. Our only evidence is that fiORocig = 1. But, since the confidence interval for 
ORnclg is (0.17, 5.9), ORncig could easily within sampling variability be 4 rather than 1. Thus 
without prior knowledge we have no justification for treating ORDclg as if it were 1. 
If on the other hand prior knowledge (e.g. ORoctg -- 49/16) was available, using GLIM 3 [18] 
we can calculate both the restricted maximum likelihood estimator and its estimated standard error 
(the observed and estimated expected information are identical in this example). If a logistic 
regression program is used, prior knowledge of OREcl6 can only be incorporated if E is the 
dependent variable, since a logistic model with D as dependent variable conditions on the E-C 
association in the data (and thus ORrcl~ is not part of the model). Conversely prior knowledge 
of ORnctE requires D as the dependent variable. Log linear models can incorporate ither type of 
prior knowledge. If ORnclg is known only to lie in the interval (2, 4), the restricted maximum 
likelihood estimator can be obtained as shown in Example B above. Confidence intervals 
incorporating the prior interval restriction on ORnctg are narrower on average than the unrestricted 
confidence interval; such confidence intervals can be calculated using either Efron's bootstrap or 
jackknife techniques [22]. 
5(0). Confidence Interval Confounding 
If we plan to report both a point estimate and a confidence interval, we should broaden the 
definition of confounding to guard against he temptation to incorrectly drop C (as in the above 
example). Specifically, C is a confidence interval (CI) nonconfounder if and only if the crude point 
estimate of the effect equals an appropriate adjusted estimate and the crude observed confidence 
interval (calculated from the crude estimate and its crude estimated standard error) equals an 
appropriate adjusted observed confidence interval (calculated from the observed values of the 
restricted maximum likelihood estimator and an estimator of its standard error derived from the 
observed information matrix). 
The crude confidence interval ignoring C should be reported if and only if there is no CI 
confounding. Below we detail situations in which, given data on C, no point estimate confounding 
exists, and show which of these also display no CI confounding. Mathematical verifications of the 
following propositions are quite straightforward. 
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In a case control study without prior knowledge and with sOR as the parameter of interest if 
one but not both of fiORecl~ and fiORoclg equal one in the data, we will have no point estimate 
confounding (since ~OR = fisOR), but we will have CI confounding and the observed crude 
confidence interval will generally be falsely narrow as in Example F. If the odds ratio is known 
a priori to be constant over strata, point estimate nonconfounding generally requires the odds ratio 
to be constant over strata in the data. 
Likewise, in a follow-up study without prior information and with sMR as the parameter of 
interest, if fiORoclg = 1 (C does not appear to be a risk factor in the data), but an E-C  association 
exists in the data, there is no point estimate confounding, but there is CI confounding. The observed 
crude confidence interval is, in general, falsely narrow. 
In a case-control study given ORecl~ = 1 a priori or in a case control or follow-up study given 
ORoclg = I, we have no CI confounding as shown in Examples A and D for all data outcomes. 
This holds whether or not the stratum specific odds ratios in case-control studies or risk ratios in 
follow-up studies are known to be constant across strata. 
In a follow-up study with sMR as parameter of interest, given no E-C association i  the data, 
we have no point estimate confounding, but unless we know ORoclg = 1 we have CI confound- 
ing with a falsely wide observed crude confidence interval. In general, this remains true in 
the presence of priori knowledge of no E - C association in the target population if standard 
errors are calculated (as they should be) conditional on the approximate ancillary/~ (as shown in 
Example C). 
5(P). Efficient Estimators Other Than the Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
Given the data from Example A with ORoclg = 1 known a priori, data analysts using efficient 
methods of estimation other than maximum likelihood (e.g., weighted least squares or minimum 
Chi-square methods) would report a restricted estimate different han ~RR = ~sMR. All three 
methods give identical crude estimates and unrestricted estimates since all three methods are Fisher 
consistent*. We still call C a point estimate nonconfounder, since ~RR does equal some, although 
not all, appropriate stimators (i.e. ?sMR--~RR) in the data at hand. Furthermore, whenever 
?sMR ~ ~RR in the observed ata, the restricted estimate calculated under the other methods will 
also in general differ from ~RR. Therefore the restriction of our previous discussion to maximum 
likelihood estimation is adequate. 
Bayes' estimators, although efficient, are unlikely to be accepted by epidemiologists a intuitively 
appropriate stimators for the evaluation of confounding. For example, in the absence of true 
prior knowledge, a Bayes estimator of the sMR will differ from ~sMR, the intuitively appropriate 
estimator, usually in the direction of one's prior beliefs about the magnitude of the sMR. 
Intuitive rejection of Bayes' estimators as appropriate implies that, to epidemiologists, appropriate 
estimators are not only efficient, but also Fisher consistent. 
The Mantel-Haenszel stimator of a common odds ratio is Fisher consistent, but inefficient. 
Although by our definitions, it is technically confounded, it is so nearly efficient [21] that the 
magnitude of confounding (i.e. the magnitude of the asymptotic bias conditional on an ancillary 
statistic that measures the degree to which the OR is not constant over strata in the data) is usually 
negligible. 
5(Q ). Implications for Design and Data Analysis 
If C is a confounder for the parameter of interest in the absence of data on C, data on C must 
be collected for valid inference. 
If, given data on C, C is a CI nonconfounder for all possible data outcomes, then data on C, 
even if collected, would not be useful for the analysis. 
If C is a nonconfounder absent data on C, but a confounder given data on C (e.g. a cumulative 
incidence follow-up study with ORec = 1), then although data on C are not necessary, if they are 
collected, inference on the sMR or a common RR will usually be more precise in large samples. 
Once data on C have been collected, inference must be performed conditional on the observed 
E-C association even if by chance a large E-C  association in the data produces conditional 
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confidence intervals based on ~RR (assuming a constant RR across strata) or ~sMR (not assuming 
constancy) of greater length than the unconditional crude confidence interval. 
5(R). Sparse Follow-up Data--the Case of Many Covariates 
If in an unmatched follow-up study, data on p rather than just two potential risk factors (each 
at two levels) is obtained, the data will consist of 2 p rather than two 2 x 2 tables of E by D. For 
a fixed sample size as data are collected on more and more covariates (i.e. p --* ~) ,  even though 
E is unassociated with the covariates in the population, (e.g. a randomized trial), it is almost certain 
that none of the 2 p tables will contain simultaneously an exposed and unexposed case, and ~RR 
(we assume here the risk ratio is constant over strata) will be undefined (i.e. its variance conditional 
on the observed exposure-covariate ssociation can be regarded as infinite). Therefore, in direct 
contrast o the case where the sample size to covariate ratio is large, inference on the RR based 
on the unconditional crude confidence interval (which is appropriate if the covariate data had not 
been obtained) would almost certainly be more precise than inference based on conditional 
confidence intervals centered on ~RR. This result is not simply a reflection of the failure of the 
normal approximation to the conditional distribution of ?RR since identical results obtain if the 
outcome, exposure, and all covariates are jointly multivariate normally distributed with exposure 
independent of all covariates. The exact conditional confidence interval for the partial regression 
coefficient of the outcome on exposure controlling for all p measured covariates will be wider than 
the crude unmatched confidence interval for the regression coefficient of outcome on exposure with 
probability approaching 1 as p ~ or. Rather the reason why the width of the exact conditional 
confidence interval exceeds that of the crude confidence interval when data on many covariates 
have been obtained is that the exact conditional confidence interval must cover the true coefficient 
for the exposure ffect 95% of the time along every possible exposure-covariate margin while the 
crude confidence interval need only cover the exposure coefficient 95% of the time unconditionally. 
Thus, for exposure-covariate margins that occur with small probability, the coverage rate of the 
crude confidence interval is unconstrained and may be either much less or much greater than 95%. 
Therefore, if Fisher's argument for conditioning on ancillary statistics is accepted, frequentist 
inference naturally leads, in sparse data, to conditional confidence intervals that are so wide as to 
be useless for inferential purposes. Additional problems for a conditional frequentist approach to 
inference in sparse data arise if, following Buehler [4], we require adherence to a continuity principle 
of inference which requires that continuous mall perturbations in a model (i.e. in our assumed 
prior knowledge) give continuous mall perturbations in the inferences drawn and actions chosen 
based on a given data set (assuming a continuous action space). 
Together the conditionally and continuity principles require that in Example C, rather than 
performing unconditional inference when no exact ancillary exists, one must condition on an 
approximate ancillary such as/~. Otherwise, in conflict with the continuity principle, one would 
abruptly jump from reporting the variance of ~sMR based on the observed information (the 
conditional variance) when the risk ratio was known to be exactly constant over strata (and thus 
an exact ancillary exists) to reporting the variance based on the expected information (the 
unconditional variance) when the risk ratio was known to be nearly but not exactly constant over 
strata (and no exact ancillary exists). See Section 8(D). 
Although we have acted as if corresponding to the prior knowledge that OREc = 1 in Example 
C, a unique approximate ancillary (i.e. B) existed, in actuality, other statistics (e.g. the likelihood 
ratio statistic for testing ORec = l) are also approximate ancillaries [5]. Nonetheless in large 
samples, for almost all data outcomes, the observed value of any of the various approximate 
ancillaries would be nearly equal. Thus, in large samples, no difficulty arises since approximate 
ancillary statistics are essentially unique. 
But when data on a large number of covariates have been obtained (i.e. sparse data) the 
distribution of any approximate ancillary, rather than being N(0, 1), can depend strongly on the 
parameter of interest, and furthermore, the observed values of various approximate ancillary 
statistics may differ markedly from one another. Therefore in sparse data we cannot uniquely 
determine which approximate ancillary to condition on. Thus we cannot uniquely determine the 
set of hypothetical repetitions on which to base our inferences. 
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These difficulties with a conditional frequentist approach to inference strongly suggest hat one 
consider a Baysian approach to statistics. 
5(S). Summary of Section 5 Results 
If our prior knowledge was such that C was a CI confounder for all possible data outcomes, 
it would be fruitless to collect data on C. In such a case, we will call C a design nonconfounder. 
For all unmatched study designs and for all effect parameters considered in this section (i.e. 
sMR, sOR, IDR), if C is known a priori not to be a risk factor for disease in the unexposed, then 
C is a design nonconfounder xcept as discussed in Section 5(J) on "Failures of Principle 4". 
In case-control studies incorporating matching on C, C would remain a point estimate and CI 
confounder. 
For the effect parameters considered in this section, if E and C are known to be unassociated 
among those at risk in an incidence density case-control study within a stable population; or if 
(a) E and C are known to be unassociated at start of follow-up in a case-control study within a 
fixed cohort; (b) at each joint level of E and C the cumulative incidence of disease (as well as the 
cumulative loss due to non-disease related reasons) is small over the follow-up period and (c) the 
control sampling fraction is small; then C is a design nonconfounder (irrespective of whether C 
was matched on in the design). This requirement that the disease be rare in a fixed cohort holds 
even for those case-control study designs in which the rare disease assumption is unnecessary for 
valid estimation of the parameter of interest (as for example in a time-matched case-control study 
within a cohort with the parameter of interest being the incidence density ratio). Technically C is 
a design nonconfounder in case control studies in fixed cohorts given ORec = 1 at start of follow-up 
only in the limit as the cumulative incidence of disease at each joint level of E and C and the control 
sampling fraction both approach zero. If the cumulative incidence is small but nonzero, C will be 
a design nonconfounder to an excellent approximation. 
The last two paragraphs correct and make precise Principle 1 in the Introduction. Principles 2 
and 3 remain as given. Principle 4 is generally false under our definition of confounding. 
6. AN EXACT THEORY OF CONFOUNDING GIVEN DATA ON C 
In the Introduction, C was defined to be an (exact) nonconfounder for a particular parameter 
of interest given data on C if and only if, for every possible outcome of the study, inference on 
the parameter of interest does not depend on the realized value of C. Since our interest is in 
inference rather than in particular decision problems: for a Bayesian, we will require that the 
marginal posterior distribution of the parameter of interest does not depend on C; for a pure 
likelihoodist, we will require that the maximized relative likelihood ratio [23, pp. 18, 19] for any 
two values of the parameter of interest does not depend on C; for a frequentist, we will require 
that the appropriate sample space does not depend on the data through C. Other approaches to 
frequentist inference, e.g. large sample maximum likelihood inference and exact uniformly most 
accurate unbiased confidence intervals will also be considered. 
We restrict our attention to parameters than can be consistently estimated from data on E, C 
and D. 
An alternative definition of nonconfounding given C would be to define C to be a data-based 
nonconfounder given data on C if inference on the parameter of interest does not depend on the 
data through C for the particular data outcome obtained. An example will be given in Section 6(E). 
6(A). Cuts, S-Sufficiency and S-Ancillarity 
In this section we review some concepts that will be necessary for further development. 
Consider a statistical model with minimal sufficient statistics (T, Q) and parameters p = (pt, P2) 
where T, Q, pl, p2 are possibly vector-valued with the following property: 
f (T, a;p, ,p2) =f  (TIQ;pl)f (Q;p2), (5) 
where f either is a density function or a probability function. If any value of P2 can arise with any 
value of p,, Q is called a cut [6]. The following properties are trivial to show; 
(1) in a Bayesian framework, ifpt and P2 have independent priors, then the posterior 
distribution of P2 depends on the data only through Q; 
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(2) the maximum likelihood estimator of P2 and its estimated asymptotic variance 
derived from either the observed information matrix or expected information 
evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimate depend on the data only 
through Q; 
(3) pure likelihood inference based on maximized relative likelihoods [23, pp. 18, 19] 
for P2 depend on the data only through Q. 
Furthermore if Q is a cut, by definition, Q is said to be S-sufficient for p~ and S-ancillary for 
pl [6]. By extended principles of conditionality and sufficiency, frequentist inference on P2 is from 
the marginal distribution of Q, and on pl is from the conditional distribution of T given Q [6]. The 
sample space for inference on P2 will be uniquely defined if Q is boundedly complete for P2 given 
Pt known [24]. The standard motivating example for the extended principles of sufficiency and 
conditionality identifies T with a measurement on a rod of unknown length p~, and Q with the 
outcome of a coin toss with unknown probability p~ of heads [20, Chap. 2]. If heads is obtained, 
the measurement is performed with a precise instrument of known variance, and otherwise with 
an imprecise instrument also of known variance. It seems imperative that inference on P2 should 
depend only on the outcome of the coin toss, while inference on pj should depend only on T and 
the known precision of the instrument actually used. 
6(B). Cross-overs 
Consider that p l -P2 = 0 was known a priori. Then the priors for Pl and P2 are no longer 
independent, and thus the posterior distribution will depend on the data through T; the restricted 
maximum likelihood estimator of p: given pl = P2 and maximized relative likelihoods for P2 will 
depend on the data through T; every value of P2 cannot arise with every value of pl, so Q is by 
definition o longer S-sufficient for P2 or S-ancillary for Pl. Information on pt from f (T I  Q;pl) 
now supplies information on p2. A prior restriction that functionally depends on both Pl and P2 
will be called a cross-over since it crosses over the cut between pt and P2. On the other hand a 
restriction such as p~ = 5 does not cross the cut, and properties 1-3 above continue to hold. 
Ifpt and P2 are of high dimensionality while the data set available is of only moderate size, then 
for frequentist or pure likelihoodist inference, we must further model the probability mechanism 
generating the data since priors with which to downweight "unlikely parameter values" are not 
allowed. Of course due to technical limitations and to the problems of prior specification, this is 
also in fact true for a Bayesian. For example, if the conditional distribution T given Q and the 
marginal distribution of Q were completely unrestricted, then equation (5), although true, would 
often be unsuitable for inference concerning P2. Since further modelling represents additional prior 
restrictions on the class of allowed probability distributions, it is important to recognize that certain 
models will themselves introduce cross-over restrictions. If in the Bayesian sense an individual's 
prior for pt and P2 are not independent, then that individual's best models, in the sense of being 
the dogmatic priors closest o his nondogmatic priors, would probably introduce a cross-over 
restriction. 
Extensions of the ideas in this section to partial likelihoods are discussed in Appendix A of 
Robins [25]. 
6(C). IDR Case-control Study in a Steady State Population 
Throughout the remainder of the paper, let xuk indicate the number of individuals with status 
(Ei, Dj, Ck), i,j, k ~ (1, 2). As before (El, Dj, Ci) is (E, D, C) but, in a change of notation, (/~,/~, ~) 
is henceforth to be written as (E2, D~, C2) rather than as (E0, Do, Co). Let 
p(EID) 
sOR = 
ClD)P(El~, C) p(EID, C)" 
P (~, p (E ID, C) +p (E, C ID)p (E ID,--~ 
cOR =p(EID)[I -p  (El/3)] 
p (E I/~)[1 --p(EID)]' 
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and 
X+I + - -  Xll +/] /~, ,X+2+ - -  X l2+J  
Suppose x+~+ incident cases and x+2÷ individuals at risk for disease are randomly sampled over 
a fixed case-ascertainment period from an infinite, dynamic, steady state population. (The 
population of all individuals of age 40-45 in the United States would serve as an excellent 
approximation to such a population over time periods of a few years.) 
Let/~j be the constant steady state incidence of disease in the population among individuals of 
status (Ei, Cj). Define the standardized incidence density ratio, 
slDR = I1 + 
p(CIE,/3)12, + [I -p(CIE,/3)]Iz2' 
to be the parameter of interest. Here/3 denotes individuals at risk. If I,,/12, = L2/Iz~ = IDR, then 
s IDR = IDR. As noted in Section 4, s IDR = sOR without any rare disease assumption [13]. 
Furthermore, C is a nonconfounder absent data on C if sOR = cOR where the exposure covariate 
condition for nonconfounding, i.e. OREcI~ = I, implies E and C are unassociated in those at risk 
without reference to any rare disease assumption. 
Assume the investigator is interested in cOR rather than sOR perhaps because C is known to 
be an intermediate variable. Intuitively, in the absence of prior knowledge, inference on cOR should 
not depend on the data through C. This intuition can be formalized by noting the product 
multinomial likelihood conditional on x+~+, x+2+ can be written (St)(S2) where 
r SI P ]X I I  + , Xl2+ ; 
S 2 =p [Xll + , Xl2+ ; 
where x = (Xlll " " " X222). Thus the 
ORr°lC ] 
OREole, ORocl~., ORecl~, p (C I E, 13) (6) 
cOR, p (E [D)], (7) 
crude data (x.+,x,2+) are a cut. If priors for the crude 
parameters are independent of the other 4 parameters; then for all three schools of inference, 
inference on cOR does not depend on the data through C. Now consider sOR as the parameter 
of interest where C is known to be a nonconfounder absent data on C either because ORnctg = 1 
or ORrc l~ = 1. Even if due to sampling variability an E -C  association exists among the controls 
and a D-C  association exists among the unexposed, nonetheless for all three schools, inference on 
the sOR still depends only on (X,l+, x~2+ ) since both of the above restrictions are noncrossovers. 
Furthermore if, e.g. OREcl~ = 1 is known a priori, further noncrossover prior knowledge that 
1 ORrolc 
ORoclg=4,p(CIE,  D)=p(C[ /3)=-~ or ORr~l------~_= 1 
supplies no additional information for inference on sOR. On the other hand additional prior 
knowledge that the effect of E and C on the incidence of disease was additive, i.e. I ,  = 12, + 1,2 - 122, 
is a cross-over restriction. In fact it is easy to show that the restricted maximum likelihood estimator 
of sOR, given both ORrcl~ = 1 and the above additive restriction, depends on the data through 
C, and has strictly smaller asymptotic variance than ~OR, which is the restricted MLE given only 
ORocl~ = 1. 
This result could in theory have implications for study design. If OREcI~ = 1 was known a priori, 
data on C, even if collected, would not be used in the analysis. But if the investigator, a
non-Bayesian, thought it possible that in years to come biological theories might prove E and C 
act additively but not multiplicatively on incidence, he might collect data on C anyway. Then if, 
in the future, additivity is proved, a reanalysis incorporating data on C will allow increased 
precision in the estimation of sOR. 
We now examine commonly practiced forms of frequentist inference that fail to explicitly 
recognize the principle of S-sufficiency. As mentioned above, large sample inference for the sOR 
based on the restricted maximum likelihood estimator and its observed or estimated expected 
information evaluated at the restricted maximum likelihood estimate will depend on the data only 
through (x,~+, xt2+ ) if ORecl~ = 1 or ORoclg = 1 is known a priori. In fact in Appendix D we show 
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that the restricted maximum likelihood estimator based on the crude data will have a strictly 
smaller asymptotic variance than the unrestricted maximum likelihood estimator unless both 
OREcI~ = 1 and ORDclg = 1. If the odds ratio is known a priori to be constant over levels of C, 
then in the absence of prior knowledge of ORoc,g or ORecl~, frequentists may calculate uniformly 
most accurate unbiased confidence intervals or conditional maximum likelihood estimates by 
conditioning on the margins {x~+~,x÷jk}. Given ORDc,g= 1 a priori, the complete minimal 
sufficient statistic is (Xlt+,X12+,Xl+l,X2+l) and thus the uniformly most accurate unbiased 
confidence interval and conditional restricted maximum likelihood estimator would be based on 
p (x11+ Ix1 ÷ +, xl ÷ i, x2 + l; OR). Likewise given ORecl~ = 1 a priori, the complete minimal sufficient 
statistic is (xll +, xl 2 +, x+11, x+ :1 ), and thus p (x11+ Ix1 + +, x+11, x+ 21 ; OR) is the relevant conditional 
distribution. But 
p (xlt+ Ixl++, xt + I, x2+ 1; OR) = p (xN+ Ix1++, x+11, x+21; OR) = p (xtl+ Ix1++ ; OR), 
and thus the optimal frequentist exact intervals do not depend on the data through C. 
EffÉcient estimators and large sample optimal confidence intervals for the common OR based on 
weighted least squares, using the prior knowledge that either ORecl~ = 1 or ORDc,z = 1, will not 
be functions of the minimal sufficient statistic, and will depend on the data through C. Therefore 
first order efficient large sample inference can be performed utilizing data on C even when C is 
a nonconfounder given C. 
6(D). Cumulative Incidence Follow-up Study 
Suppose, as described in Section 4, xl + + exposed, and x2+ + nonexposed individuals are randomly 
sampled from a near-infinite nondiseased population that is followed for a specified time period. 
Individuals developing disease are labelled D or Dr. Define Pu = P (D I E~, Cj). 
Then 
sMR = pIIp(CIE) + pl2p(CIE) and ~RR =(xtl+/xl++ )/(x21÷/x2++ ) 
P21P (CIE) + P22P (C I E) 
and sMD = (P11- P21)P (C [E )+ (Pl2-P~)P (C I E). In follow-up studies, except as discussed in 
Section 6(E), all the following results for the sMR apply equally to sMD. 
The likelihood for this follow-up study is (S~)($3) where S~ = $1 from equation (6) with xl2+ 
replaced by x21 + and $3 = p [x11 +, x21 + I cRR, p (DIE)]. If eRR is the parameter of interest, and the 
priors for the crude parameters are independent of the other four, then all three schools of inference 
would ignore data on C. Furthermore, with sMR as parameter of interest, if ORDc,~- = 1 is known 
a priori, then inference on sMR =cRR is independent of data on C; but if ORec = 1 is known 
a priori, then inference on sMR for all schools of inference depends on the data through C since 
ORec = 1 is a cross-over restriction. 
In fact, if the risk ratio is constant over levels of C, then the likelihood is 
p (x Ix1 + i ,  X2 + 1 ; RReDIe, RRoclg, p+ +) p (xl + 1, x2 + 1 ; p (C 1/~), ORec). (8) 
Therefore (xl +1, x~+l) is S-ancillary for RReole = sMR. Thus inference on the common RR will 
be independent of any prior knowledge concerning ORec for all three school of inference provided 
priors for [p (C I/T), OREc] are independent of those for the other three parameters. 
6(E). Cumulative Incidence Type Case-control Study 
Consider an unmatched case-control study of a near-infinite superpopulation, in which x+l + 
diseased and x+2+ nondiseased are randomly sampled at the end of follow-up. As discussed in 
Section 4, given data on C, sOR but not sMR can be consistently estimated [10]. If the disease 
is rare at each level of E and C, i.e. p+ + = Pll + Plz + P~I + P22 ~ O, then sOR ~ sMR. In the absence 
of data on C, consistent estimation of sOR requires that cOR = sOR which holds if and only if 
ORec,t~ = 1 or ORDc,~ = 1 [11, Chap. 13]. 
Since in a case-control study, sMR, the parameter of interest, is consistently estimable only as 
p+ + ~ 0, we extend our definition of confounding absent data on C (given in Section 4) as follows: 
C is a nonconfounder absent C in a cumulative incidence case-control study under the rare disease 
assumption if and only if the parameter of interest equals a crude parameter in the limit as p+ + ~ 0. 
C.A.M,W.A. 14/9-12---Q 
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Given ORrc = 1 and p+ + ~ 0, then ORecl~ ~ 1. Thus, as noted in Section 4, as p+ + ~ 0 the 
conditions for nonconfounding absent data on C for the SMR are the same in both a cumulative 
incidence follow-up study and an unmatched case-control study. Note that the rare disease 
assumption is formally p++ ~0 and not that p (D)~0.  
The likelihood for an unmatched cumulative incidence case-control study is S~S~ as defined in 
equation (6) and (7). The likelihood is independent of p+ +. Therefore in analogy with the above 
definition of nonconfounding absent C under the rare disease assumption, C is defined to be a 
nonconfounder given (data on) C in a cumulative incidence case-control study if in the limit as 
p+ + ~0,  inference on the sMR does not depend on the data through C. 
Given ORec = 1 known apriori, ORecj~ = (1 -p11)(1 - P22)/[(1 -p12)(1 -P21)]. With x+l+, x+2+ 
fixed by the sampling scheme, a Taylor series expansion of the likelihood SI $2 around ORrcl~ = 1 
shows that as p+ + ~0 the likelihood is just S~ $2 evaluated at ORrcl~ = 1 multiplied by a factor 
of [1 + O (p+ + )]. Therefore, given OREc = 1, as p+ + ~ 0 since both sOR and sMR equal cOR 
[1 + O (p++)], inference on the cOR, sOR or sMR will not depend on the data through C for all 
three schools of inference given the appropriate prior independences. In the Bayesian case, we have 
used the fact that as the prior probability mass of p+ + converges to 0, the posterior distributions 
for cOR and sMR become identical. 
Note that it is only by means of the above Taylor series expansions of the likelihood that 
Miettinen and Cook's Principle 1, described in the Introduction, can be justified in cumulative 
incidence case-control studies under the rare disease assumption. 
If instead ORoo~ = 1 is known a priori, C will also be a nonconfounder given C since the prior 
restriction remains a noncrossover. 
We now compare the inference that would be drawn from prospective follow-up of a population 
in which the disease is rare and ORrc = 1. To do so, since the prospective likelihood $1 $3 depends 
on p++, we consider sequences of follow-up studies in which p++ ~0,  xl++, x2++ ~ oo in such a 
way that x~ + +/x2+ + and E (xi+j)Po are constant. The results given in the remainder of this section 
do not apply to the sMD. We first consider the case where RReolc = RR~o)e = RR. By expression 
(8), given appropriate prior independences, inference on the RR is independent of the prior 
knowledge ORec = 1. Nevertheless ince OI~ec=(XI+I)(X2+2)/(X2+I)(Xt+2) converges to 1 in 
probability as x~ ++, x2++--* oo, it is of interest o examine the limiting case in which Oi~Ec = 1. 
Consider the approximation 
(xilj I xi +j) ,-, Poisson (PuX~ +j). (9) 
For data outcomes atisfying 
x~+j >~ ~ > 0 for somef ixed  ~, and (Xilk) < (Xi+k) 1/2, (10) 
Xi+ + 
as xi+ + - ' *  o0 , pij-"~ O 
P (x, O) = B (x, O)[1 + o (1)], (11) 
where B (x, O) is the true product binomial ikelihood conditional on {x~+ k }, and P (x, O) is the 
product over i, j of Poisson likelihoods based on expression (9). 
Equation (11)justifies calculating likelihood ratios based on P(x ,  O)  in the limit as P0-* 0, 
xi++--* oc for data outcomes atisfying expression (10). Furthermore since outcomes atisfying 
expression (10) occur with probability 1 as xi++ ~ oo, frequentist inference, conditional on both 
{X~+k} and on such outcomes, can be based on P(x ,  O) as x~++--* oo. 
P(x ,  0 )  = F~F2, 
where 
2 
El = I-I pr[xHklx+I~'Xt+k'X~+k ' RR] (12) 
k=l 
F2 = pr IX+l+, x+H Ix1 + i, xl +~, Pl, P2], (13) 
where 
(XllklX+ Ik, Xl + k, X~ + k) ~ Binomial [x+ lk, xl + k RR/(xl + k RR + x2 + k)] 
P~ = pz~[RR + (X2+k/Xl +k)]" 
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If Ol~Ec = 1, then X2+k/Xl +k = m where m -x2++/xl++ is fixed by the sampling scheme and 
Pk = P~ [RR + m ]. Therefore 
Fl = pr (Xlll, X211 Ix+l+, Xl + 1, Xl +~)pr (xll+ Ix+l+ ; RR, m], (14) 
where 
(xLl+ Ix+l+ ) "~ Binomial [x+l+, RR/(RR + m)]. (15) 
If we regard RR, Pl, P2 as the model "parameters" by expressions (13) and (14), we have for 
outcomes atisfying expression (10) that as po.~O, x~++ ~ oo, C is a data-based nonconfounder 
given C whenever O~zc = 1 for all 3 schools of inference provided every value of RR can occur 
with every value of (P~,/)2) and priors for RR and (P1, P2, Pclz, OREc) are independent. From 
a frequentist perspective, the justification for calling C a data-based nonconfounder given C when 
OREc = 1 is by appeal to a pointwise version of the extended principle of conditionality as in 
Barndorff-Nielsen [26] that would require inference for the RR based on P (x, O) to depend only 
on expression (15) when O~Ec = 1. In the Bayesian case, justification depends on equation (11) 
together with the fact that the prior probability masses for the Pu are converging to 0. For the pure 
likelihoodist, justification depends only on the fact that data outcomes atisfy expression (10) and 
xi+ + ~ oo without regard for restrictions on the p~j. 
O ~<Pu ~< 1 and 0 ~< RR ~< oo together imply max(Pk) = RR + m if RR < 1 and max(Pk) = 
1 + m/RR if RR > 1. Therefore it is necessary that we restrict he Pk such that 
Pk < min(1, m) (16) 
in order that every value of RR and (P~, P2) can occur together. For fixed m, expression (16) will 
certainly hold in the limit as Pu ~ 0. If RR and (Pl,/)2) are independent a a given value of m, then 
they will be dependent for other values of m. Thus it would be unusual for an individual to actually 
hold priors with RR and (Pl,/)2) independent. 
We now consider other forms of frequentist inference for the RR based on P(x,  O) when 
OR~c = 1. The maximum likelihood estimator and its estimated asymptotic variance, as well as 
exact confidence intervals and the conditional maximum likelihood estimator based on expression 
(15), all depend on the data only through (XH+,X21+). 
In practice (x~lklxi+ k) will not be quite Poisson, and Ol~Ec will not be exactly one. Nevertheless, 
for data sets in which X~lk/Xi+k is small and Oi~Ec ~ 1, the crude inference based on expression (15) 
will serve as an excellent approximation to inference based on B (x, O) provided that in the 
Bayesian case small values ofp,.y are accorded significant prior probability, and the necessary prior 
independences hold. In this paper we restrict our attention to the theoretical limiting relationships 
and do not discuss the accuracy of the approximation. 
If the risk ratio had not been constant over levels of C, {x~+ k } are not S-ancillary for sMR, and 
no factorization similar to equation (14) appears to exist. Nonetheless, traightforward calculation 
demonstrates that if Ol~rc = 1, the maximum likelihood estimator of sMR is ~RR. Furthermore, 
in the limit as xi+ + ~ oo, for data outcomes satisfying expression (10) both the estimated asymptotic 
variance of the maximum likelihood estimator based on either the observed or expected 
information and maximized relative likelihood ratios for the sMR depend on the crude data alone. 
These results remain true if ORrc = 1 is known a priori. 
The above results for follow-up studies under the rare disease assumption imply that, given 
ORzc= 1 is known, the asymmetry between cumulative incidence case-control studies and 
follow-up studies as expressed for example in Principles 1 and 3 of the Introduction would, for 
most (but not all) data outcomes, be of little consequence since in a follow-up study, as x~+  ~ oo, 
and p++ ~0,  Ol~Ec converges to 1 in probability. 
6(F). Cumulative Incidence Case-control Study Within a Cohort 
Consider a sample of size N randomly selected at start of follow-up from a near-infinite 
superpopulation, x+~ + cases develop during follow*up. All x+ ~ + cases and a further x+2+ controls 
sampled at random from the (N - x+ ~ + ) non-cases have their E and C statuses determined, sMR 
is again the parameter of interest. As noted in Section 4, since p (D) can be estimated as x+~+/N, 
eRR can now be estimated from the crude data even when p++ ~ 0 [12]. Therefore, sRR can be 
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consistently estimated absent data on C whenever sRR =cRR,  i.e. OREc----- 1 or ORDclE--'-- 1. 
Consider further this case-control study within a cohort with sMR as parameter of interest. Let 
N = {N~+j} be the vector of the unobserved number of individuals of status E~, Cj in the cohort. 
Assume prior knowledge is available that OREc = 1 in the infinite super population. The frequency 
functions for the observed ata can be written 
p (x) = ~ p (x, N). (17) 
Ni +j > x i +j 
Straightforward calculation shows that the restricted maximum likelihood estimator given 
ORec = 1 as well as the relative maximized likelihood ratio depend on the data through C. 
Nonetheless since a case-control study within a cohort design is usually chosen in the study of 
a rare disease, it is of interest o examine inference on the sMR under the rare disease assumption. 
Since the likelihood depends on p+ + we must consider sequences of studies in which p+ + --* 0 as 
N--*oo in such a way that E(N~+j)p o is constant. Let a be the fraction of the (N-x+~+) 
nondiseased individuals elected as controls. If a = 1, we have the equivalent of the full follow-up 
study considered in Section 6(E). 
At the other extreme if we consider the case in which as N ---, ~,  aN is constant, we can show 
that (x~+,x~2+) form a cut for sMR as N--* ~.  Consider data outcomes in which as N--. ~ ,  
X#k < N ~/2 and xm > bN for some fixed b > 0. Such outcomes will occur with probability 1 as 
N -* ~ provided p~+j =p (El, Cj) is bounded away from 0 by E, for some E > 0. Then as N --* oo, 
by a Taylor series expansion 
where 
p (x) = UV[1 + o (1)], 
U =p [x Ix+,+, x+2+, E(N)] 
V = p [x+,+, x+2+ [E (N)] ~px+ ~+ (1 - p)~V- ~+,+ 
P = ~PikPi+k. 
i.k 
As N--) oo, U is just Sl S: as defined in equations (6) and (7). Therefore x+ ~+, x+2+ are S-ancillary 
for the 6 parameters of S~, $2. Furthermore if ORzc = 1 is known a priori, as N -=) oo by a Taylor 
series expansion, U equals $1 $2 evaluated at ORecl~ = 1, multiplied by a factor [1 + 0 (1)]. Thus 
regarding x+l+,x+2+ as fixed and given ORec = 1, as p~--,0 and N--, ~ ,  (xll+, xl2+) become 
S-sufficient for sMR conditional on data outcomes with xi~k < N ~/2, Xt2k > bN. Miettinen and Cook 
[1] claim that in a cumulative incidence case control study within a cohort, the crude analysis is 
appropriate. The above Taylor series expansion defines conditions under which their claim is true. 
Therefore, given OREc = 1 known a priori, for actual data sets with a = x+2+/(N-  x+l+)~, 0
and (Xiik/Xnk)a ~,0, inference based on the crude data will be an excellent approximation to 
inference based on equation (17) irrespective of associations observed in the data, provided that 
in the Bayesian case the necessary prior independences hold and small values of Po are accorded 
significant prior probability. Again we do not consider the accuracy of the approximation. 
7. EXTENSION TO ARBITRARY RANDOM VARIABLES 
Let (E, C, D) represent any random variables, continuous or discrete. Define reference levels 
(Eo, Co, Do). In epidemiologic studies Do signifies the nondiseased state and Eo a nonexposed state 
whenever such categorizations are epidemiologically meaningful. 
7(A). Confounding Absent Data on C--General Case 
Consider an unmatched case-control study either of cumulative incidence type or of incidence 
density type within a stable population. Define: 
g(C, E, D) =- p(C, EID) p(Co, EIDo) 
p(C, EIDo) p(Co, EID) 
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h(C,E,D)= 




where p (0, l ) l ) represents a density or frequency function. 
g (C, EO, D), h (C, E, D), q 6% D) generalize OR,,,,-, 
OR,,c 
-, OR,,c, respectively. 
OR,,c 













sOR(E, D) = cOR(E, D)oB = F (18) 
Expression (18) extends to arbitrary random variables results of Whittemore [271 and Shapiro 
[28] for contingency tables. Since cOR(E, D) can be consistently estimated from the crude data in 
an unmatched case-control study, expression (18) gives conditions under which C is a non- 
confounder absent data on C in an unmatched case-control study. 
Ifh(C,E,D)=l,theng(C,E,D)=g(E,D)andsOR(E,D)=q(E,D).WethensaythatEand 
C interact multiplicatively. This generalizes the notion of constancy of the odds ratio over levels 
of C from the contingency table context. 






n(E’c9 D)=p(D,lC, C) 
that if for all E, C, p (D, I E, C) x 1 (which defines the rare disease assumption), then 
s 
n (E, C, D)P (C IE, Do) dC 
cOR(E, D) = 
s 
x 
n (Eo, C, D)P(C IEm Do) dC 
s P(DIE,C)p(CIE)dC P(DIE) 
s 
= cRR(E, D) 
P(DIJ%,C)~(CIEJ~C 
=p(DlEo) 
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r = sMR(E, D). 
J p(DlEm C)p(CIE)dC 





which is a generalization of results of Shapiro [28] for contingency tables. Equation (19) provides 
conditions under which C is a nonconfounder absent C in a cumulative incidence follow-up study. 
7(B). Confounding Given Data on C-Case-control Studies 
Consider an unmatched case-control study likelihood with Nk individuals randomly sampled 
from Dk, k~(1 .. * K) with sOR(E, D) as parameter of interest. For control j from disease 
level k 
p (Ejk, Cj/rlD/z) = Llj/cLzjk, 
where 





P (Ejk I D/c) E L2jk 3 
where we note h (CjO , EjO, D,) = g (CjO , E, , 0,) = 1. Thus the likelihood 
study is L,, Lz+ where 
for the full case-control 
L1+ is parameterized by h (C, E, D), g (C, E,, D),p (C I E, D,). L2+ depends on the data only 
through {(Ejk, D,)} and is parameterized by cOR(E, D), p (E I D,). Since 
P(Ej/cIDk) = 
cOR(E,k 9 Dk ) P (Ejk IDo 1 
s 
cORW,h-‘(EIQW’ 
{(Ejk, Ok)} is a cut and will be complete for [p (E, DO), cOR(E, D)] at fixed values of the other 
parameters in the class of all probability distributions. Furthermore, if cOR(E, D) = sOR(E, D) 
then B = F from expression (18). B = F is a noncrossover estriction. Thus, if sOR is the parameter 
of interest, C is a nonconfounder given C if it is a nonconfounder absent C. 
7(C). Confounding Given Data on C-Follow-up Study 
Let sMR be the parameter of interest. We intercharge E with D in our previous notation, i.e. 
E is now effect, and D is dose, to allow reuse of formulae in Section 7(B). 
L,, L/k, L,+, and L2+ are as defined previously and the product L,, &+ is the full follow-up 
study likelihood. Since p (E,k IDk) = cRR (Dk, Ejk)p (Ejk ID,), {(Ejk, D,)} remains a cut, iS S- 
sufficient for cRR(D, E), p (E ID,), and S-ancillary for h (C, E, D), g (C, E,, D),p (C (E, D,). 
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However, 
f" 
|L~cRR(D, E)p (EIDo) dE 
P (CID) / 
p(e[Do) (CLE, Do)p(EIDo)dE 
where L~ is Lljk without subscripts j, k. 
Thus formula (19) represents a complex cross-over restriction unless the noncross-over restriction 
p (C I E, Do) = p (C I Do) ~p (E I Do, C) = p (E I Do) holds, i.e. unless C is not a risk factor for disease 
in the unexposed. If data on another covariate C" is available and prior knowledge xists 
concerning the joint distribution of (E, C, D) conditional on C', the results of Sections 7(A)-(C) 
hold, provided each expression is interpreted as being conditional on C'. This remains true even 
if C' was matched on in the design, e.g. in a case-control study controls were sampled from 
individuals at the same level of C' as a case. 
7(D ). Model Restrictions 
In applications various statistical models, e.g. logistic models, are commonly employed. Since 
models represent additional prior restrictions on the class of allowed probability distributions, it 
is important to recognize that certain models will themselves introduce cross-over restrictions. For 
example, in Section 6(C) the additional prior knowledge that ORecl~ = 1 in an additive incidence 
model represented a cross-over restriction, while in a multiplicative incidence model, i.e. a logistic 
model without an interaction term, it did not. We must assume for our theoretical results that 
model restrictions are known a priori, and thus are not subject o revision in light of the data. 
8. A STAT IST ICAL  INTERPRETAT ION OF THE 
EP IDEMIOLOGIST 'S  CONCEPT OF CONFOUNDING 
Our perspective that confounding given data on C depends on certain likelihood factorizations 
is far from the intuitive understanding of confounding that exists in the epidemiologic literature. 
In Section 5 we informally described a coherent statistical interpretation f Miettinen and Cook's 
[1] intuitive concept of confounding. In this section, we formalize the results given in Section 5. 
8(A ). Appropriate Estimators are Unconditionally Efficient 
Miettinen and Cook define C to be a nonconfounder given data on C if and only if the "crude 
estimate of effect equals an appropriate adjusted estimate in the data at hand". They fail to define 
the class of appropriate adjusted estimators. We show appropriate adjusted estimators must be 
asymptotically efficient if Principles 1 and 2 in the Introduction are to hold. 
Given a model F(x, 0),  0 = (0~.. .  Ok), let 120 be the vector of unrestricted maximum 
likelihood estimators of O, and ?O be the restricted maximum likelihood estimators of those 
components of O that are not known a priori. 
Consider the cumulative incidence follow-up study of Section 6(D) in which ORoclg = 1 is known 
a priori, but ~RR = ~sMR ~ fisMR in the data at hand, since ORoclg ~ fiORoclg. Principle 1 
suggests ~sMR be reported in lieu of fisMR. Similarly by Principle 2, if ORoclg = 2 say, is known 
a priori, and fisMR = ~RR ~ ~sMR in the data at hand because fiORoclg = 1, then ~RR must be 
adjusted to ~sMR by symmetry with the previous example. Thus in both instances the efficient 
~sMR is "appropriate", while the asymptotically unbiased but inefficient estimator ~sMR is not. 
8(B). Appropriate Estimators are Conditionally Asymptotically Unbiased 
Epidemiologists in general assume that a crude estimate is confounded by C if it fails to equal 
any intuitively unbiased estimator in the observed ata. The epidemiologists' "intuitive bias" is not 
exact bias since ~RR is intuitively unbiased for cRR but has an infinite expectation. Rather 
estimators considered to be "intuitively unbiased" appear to be estimators that are locally 
uniformly asymptotically unbiased; see Section 8(E). Until Section 8(E), we restrict our attention 
to maximum likelihood estimation, since implicit in Miettinen and Cook's examples and in 
discussions of confounding inthe epidemiologic l terature in general is concern with inference based 
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only on the method of maximum likelihood as demonstrated by the choice of ~RR - ~sMR rather 
than, e.g. a minimum Chi-square stimator, as the "appropriate stimator" given ORocrg = 1 a 
priori. 
Epidemiologists who view fisMR in the above examples with ORocfz known as "intuitively 
biased" are implicitly conditioning on an approximate ancillary statistic such as 
,~ = (fiORocl~ - ORDctE) 
~ ar ( fi O R ncl ~ )t~o ' 
that measures the degree to which the observed ORoclg association differs due to sampling 
variability from its known population value. 
We show that fisMR is conditionally asymptotically biased. The level of argument is rather 
heuristic in the spirit of Cox and Hinckley [20, Chap. 9]. 
(i) Let x~,.., x~ N be Ni independent identically distributed random vectors with 
distribution ~(x, O) for i = (1 . .. L) where x ~ R p, O = (O] . . .  Ok) ~ AcR k. 
Each Fi may depend on only a subset of O. Define P = (P] . . .  PL), where 
Pg - N#N and P~ is presumed known and constant for all 
L 
N= ~.N~ as N~.  
i=1 
(ii) Assume (aO~ . . .  aOk) are minimal sufficient for O. 
(iii) Assume aO ~ I~1 [O, I- l ] as N ~ ~ where I~1 [O, I- ' ] is the multivariate normal 
distribution with mean O and covariance matrix I-~; I = E (I); I is the matrix 
L N i 
for i, je{l . . .k};  L(O,x)= ~ Z logf(xo, O); f(o,o) 
L ao,aoj i f f i l j= l  
is the density or frequency function associated with F~(o, o). 
(iv) Furthermore, we assume that aO is locally uniformly asymptotically normal as 
defined in Section 8(E) over the interior of the parameter space and that the 
elements of I are smoothly differentiable functions of O. 
If O k = Oko is known a priori, then 
.~= ~Ok--Oko ~N(0 ,1)  as N~oo.  
~/Var (aOk)l~o 
Now we show that a reparameterization (O] . . .  Ok- ,, D) exists such that aD = (2/v / -N) .  Since 
aO is a minimal sufficient, ~O = g](a@) for some function gt. Therefore, [Var(aO,)~o N] t/:= 
g2(aO, P,O~o) for some function g:. Thus, ,~/~//-N=g~(aO, ~o,P) for some g3. Let 
D =g~(O, Og o, P). Then ,4 = ~/-NaD and Ok = Oko =~D = 0. Thus, following Cox and Hinckley 
[20, Chap. 9] by condition (iii) 
(aOl IX) ,,- N(O,  
where 
Cov(~70], t~D). ) 
uD, a 2 as N~oo,  
Cov2(~Ol, ~D) 
a 2 = Var ~Ol Var(~D) 
and Vat, Cov are asymptotic variances and covariances determined by the appropriate row and 
column of 1-1. 
Thus, asymptotic bias (~70~ I,~) = [Coy(riOt, tTD)/Var(zTD)],,l. Cox and Hinckley point out that 
an asymptotically efficient estimator of O~ conditional on ,,T is 
. . . .  
= - - (uz~)  
ae,+ k. J 
and furthermore that a first order expansion of the log-likelihood gives PO, = Q + O,(1/N). 
Therefore, 70~ is to Op(l/N) the conditional as well as unconditional maximum likelihood 
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estimator of Oi. Therefore, asymptotic bias (rOllZ4~)= 0, and asymptotic bias (~O~l,~)= 0~* 
Cov(~O~, ~D) = 0oCov(gO1, gOk) = 0oVar(~Ol) = Var(~O~) which links conditional asymp- 
totic bias to the unconditional efficiency of ~Oi. Since Var(~O~l,'~)= Var(~O~lA)= a :, condi- 
tionally it is only asymptotic bias that distinguishes the two estimators. Furthermore to O (1) the 
asymptotic bias of gO1 will not depend on the parameterization f the restriction. 
8(C). Conditional Inference to 0 (N -m) in Variance 
Efron and Hinckley originally pursued the idea that inference should be performed conditional 
on approximate ancillaries. They give both theoretical and Monte Carlo justification in one 
parameter problems for preferring in moderate sized samples I~ 1 to I~ ~ as an estimator of the 
conditional variance for use in conditional Wald-type confidence intervals. Their preference for I~ 1 
to I~ ~ depended on the fact that [Var( fO)-  Var(?O 1~')] is O(N-3a). Thus the standard large 
sample results of Section 8(B), accurate only to O (l/N) in variance, could not be invoked. 
Barndorff-Nielsen [29] and Amari [30] extended these results to the multiparameter situation. They 
considered independent and identically distributed observations from continuous curved ex- 
ponential families with the unrestricted parameter space an open subset of finite dimensional 
Euclidian space. 
Given Ok = Oko redefine O as 0 = (01 • • • Ok- ~ ). They essentially proved that if I is a function 
of ,'T/x/~ then: 
(1) N Var(O11,'~) and N Var (~)  differ conditional on .4 by O (1/x/~). 
(2) N[I~']~.~ is to at least Op(1/N) the conditional maximum likelihood estimator 
of N Var (rO~ [,~), and is thus conditionally efficient. 
(3) N[Izd]~.~ is conditional on .4, consistent but asymptotically biased for 
N Var(?O I/~). 
(4) N[lieL]l.l is unconditionally efficient for NVar(~O). N[I&l]l,l will be uncon- 
ditionally, inefficient but asymptotically unbiased for VarN(?Ol). 
The extension of their results to our multiple sample situation should not be difficult. The proper 
extension of their proofs to discrete random variables will not be considered although at a 
minimum we must bound the parameter space of multinomial probabilities away from 0 or 1 
by E for some E to obtain asymptotic normality even to O (l/N) in variance uniformly over the 
entire parameter space. Rather we show below that if Var(?OllX) is formally defined to be 
[E (I (O, x)l/T)]~l I , then conditions (1)-(4) can be derived in a heuristic manner by a Taylor series 
expansion to O(N-3/~). We offer this as a heuristic demonstration of the reasonableness of 
conditions (1)-(4) in the discrete case even if as in our examples the moments of rOl are infinite. 
Practically in curved models we would expect as in Efron and Hinckley [5] that approximate 
Wald-type confidence intervals based on I~ I more closely approach the nominal confidence 
coefficient than intervals based on I;e ~ in repeat Monte Carlo trials conditional on .4. 
If (uOl. . .  UOk) is mapped 1-1 onto (~,  UOk--Oko) and thus onto (~O,,'~/x//N), then by a 
Taylor series expansion around (~O -O)  we have 
NVar(rOIIX)-N{EII(O'rO'- N ~)]}l,I=NII-1(O'O' "4 1 
Since E[~O -O1.~] and Var(~O I,'/) are O(1/N). The final O(1/N) term in expression (20) is 
O (l/N) conditional on /~ and Op(1/N) unconditionally since .4 is Op(1). Similarly by a Taylor 
expansion 
(') N[I-'],.1 =- N Var(~O,) = N[E(I)]F.; = N[I- ' (O, O, 0)] + O ~ , (21) 
since 
Vary,o> Var( ) are O(1) 
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Therefore from expression (20) and (21), respectively 
(') N Var(~Oi 12)r,o = N[Ii-~]l,t + Op ~V 
(1) 




I (O,~O,-~) is a function of ( -~N) '  
then by a further Taylor expansion, 
[ ( .4 )],., ( 1 ), 
N 1 -I @,@, -~ =N[I-I(@,@,0)]1.1+0 conditional on ~ (24) 
NdI-'(@, @, x) x=0 since/1 and ~x are O (1). 
Likewise, 
I ~ 1 N l-l(rO, rO, A-'~'~]4N/IJI,I = N[I-I(~O, FO, O)]Ia + Ov (~)  unconditionally. (25) 
Furthermore, by equations (21) and (23), 
[E(NI~I I/T)]1,1 =N[I-I(0,0,0)]1.1+0(1). (26) 
Finally expressions (20), (21) and (24) imply condition (1); equation (22) implies condition (2); 
expressions (20), (24) and (26) imply condition (3); equation (23) and (25) imply condition (4). 
Conditions (1)-(4) remain true if Ok = Oko represents p restrictions on a p-vector of parameters 
provided .4 is then the corresponding p-vector of approximate ancillaries (AI ... ,4p). 
As stressed by Sprott [31], if 
- I  
are to be used to form large sample (1 -  ~) conditional confidence intervals, @1 should be 
parameterized such that at the observed sample size the maximized relative likelihood for @1 is 
nearly normal in shape, z~/2 is the upper ~/2 percentage point of a normal distribution with mean 
0 and variance 1. 
If it is accepted that I~ 1 is preferred over I~ * because NI~ 1 is conditionally asymptotically biased 
for N Var(VO I,'/), then efficient rather than inefficient but consistent estimators of N Var(PO~) 
would be preferred for Wald-type confidence intervals even when I is functionally independent of 
,~. For example 
N[I~--~]1,1 and N[l~'~]l ,  1 
consistent but inefficient estimator of N Var(~@~) if Cov(aOi, a@k) # 0. are unconditionally 
Therefore 
N [I~'~ ]1,1 
will be conditionally asymptotically biased for N Var(~@ 1,4). 
8(D ). A Justification for Conditioning on Approximate Ancillaries 
In this section we illustrate the necessity of conditioning on approximate ancillaries in curved 
models for large sample inference to O (N -3/2) in variance if the conditionality principle for exact 
ancillaries and a continuity principle of inference, as outlined by Buehler [4], arc both accepted. 
Such a continuity principle states that if p, Pl ,  P2 . . .  are specifications uch that l im p, = p then if 
s, sl ,  s2. • • are their solutions then lim s, = s. We take st to be Wald-type large sample confidence 
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intervals accurate to O (N -3/2) in variance with standard errors derived from efficient estimators 
of the appropriate expected information matrix. If we do not condition on approximate ancillaries, 
by equation (23) estimated standard errors can be based on either I~ I or I -  1 (~O, ~O, 0) for inference 
accurate to O (N -3/2) in variance. In fact for the class of generalized linear models [32] I~ m and 
I -  l (~9, ~O, 0) are exactly equal. 
For inference conditional on the vector of approximate ancillaries .4, by equation (22) estimated 
standard errors can be based on either 
I~  I or [E(IIA)];-d. 
We choose l id for reasons of computational convenience. 
If an S-ancillary statistic exists all expectations are conditional on the S-ancillary statistic 
irrespective of whether or not they are taken conditional on any approximate ancillaries as well. 
Consider as an illustrative xample the unmatched cumulative incidence follow-up study of 
Section 6(D). With ORec = 1 known a priori, ERR and PsMR are unconditionally asymptotically 
unbiased for sMR. In Appendix C we show that, in general, Var(~sMR)< Var(ERR) to O(N -I) 
unless ERR is asymptotically unbiased conditional on .4. Conditional on .4, the approximate 
ancillary, we show in Appendix C that in general E (ERR-  sMRI.4) is O (N -I/2) and thus ERR 
is conditionally asymptotically biased. Furthermore, Var(PsMRI.zT)# Var(fsMR) to O(N -3/2) 
since I - i  is a function of 2. 
Now given ~ = ~t 0 is known a priori as well, where RReobc = RReoI~ + ct, if Cto> 0 no exact 
ancillary exists. But when ~ =0,  (Xl+l,X2+l) are S-ancillary for sMR. Let Ai, .4~ be the 
approximate ancillaries associated with prior knowledge that ORec = 1 and a = 0t o respectively. 
Since -'~l ~ 0 implies 
-1 Else ]1.1 - [E(Ilxl+l, x2+ i)l~O]lSl I ~ 0, 
without an extension of the conditionality principle to include approximate ancillaries, uncon- 
-1 ditional confidence intervals based on [leo ]1.1 for ~to ~ 0 known a priori would abruptly change to 
conditional confidence intervals based on 
[E(Ilxl+l,X2+m)l~s]?.l I at ~o=0. 
On the other hand, if inference is conditional on (,~l, -42), confidence intervals for all ~o would be 
1-1 based on ( es)l.~, a continuous function of ~t o. 
Thus if we plan to condition on exact S-ancillary statistics, a continuity principle of inference 
(that requires continuous perturbations in model specification give continuous perturbations in
inferences drawn from a given data set) necessitates conditioning on approximate ancillaries. 
Furthermore, Wald-type confidence intervals accurate to O (N -3/2) in variance are obtained by 
conditioning on approximate ancillaries .4 whenever I is a function of /T, and performing 
unconditional inference otherwise, even in the presence of exact ancillaries since (I~)1.1 is 
unaffected by conditioning on exact ancillaries. 
In our example of Section 6(A) since the restriction ORoclg = 1 was on a natural parameter of 
the exponential model, no curvature was introduced, and thus .4 was not a function of the minimal 
sufficient statistic. Efron and Hinkley [5], Barndorff-Nielsen [29] and Amari [30] assumed reduction 
by sufficiency in the restricted model prior to conditioning on approximate ancillaries. Epi- 
demiologists in viewing fisMR as biased conditional on .4 are conditioning prior to reducing by 
sufficiency. But when ORoclg is known, I;~ = I~ ~. Therefore conditional and unconditional 
Wald-type confidence intervals centered on ~O will be identical. Thus for large sample inference 
to O (N -3/2) in variance, in an uncurved model it appears to be of only philosophical rather than 
practical concern whether fisMR is viewed as conditionally biased or unconditionally inefficient. 
Thus inference conditional on approximate ancillaries offers a parsimonious, intuitive, and 
unified view of Wald-type confidence intervals accurate to O (N -3/2) in variance, whether or not 
exact ancillaries exist, and whether or not the approximate ancillary is a function of the minimal 
sufficient statistic. Inappropriate estimators are then in accord with the intuition of epidemiologists 
"biased" estimators, albeit asymptotically biased. If on the other hand the sufficiency principle is 
preserved and as a consequence the conditionality principle is extended to approximate ancillaries 
only in curved models, then the previous unified summary must be modified such that in uncurved 
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models inappropriate estimators are inefficient estimators and in curved models they are asymp- 
totically biased estimators. 
Approximate confidence intervals based on the acceptance r gions of likelihood ratio tests give 
large sample conditional confidence intervals accurate to O (N -3/2) without the need to explicitly 
consider the existence of approximate ancillaries in forming the confidence interval [5]. Confidence 
intervals based on the acceptance region of a score test would require that in curved models, 
expectations be taken conditional on approximate ancillary statistics. 
8(E). Preliminary Test Estimators and Uniform Asymptotic Unbiasedness 
We have shown that nonconfounding iven data on C requires in general correct prior 
knowledge concerning nature. It may be argued that we never have correct prior knowledge, but 
only prior beliefs, i.e. extreme data results will always make us revise our prior opinions, no matter 
how firmly held. 
Frequentist tatisticians, when faced with this difficulty, have often suggested that an investigator 
with interest in a parameter O~, who in addition has a strong prior belief but not true prior 
knowledge that Ok = Oko, perform a preliminary test of the hypothesis Ok = Oko at some 
predetermined significance l vel. If the test rejects, the estimate aO1 is reported and t~O~ otherwise. 
This so-called preliminary test estimator, ffOt, is asymptotically normal with asymptotic ex- 
pectation O~ and asymptotic variance equal to that of ffO~, provided Ok ~ Oko [33]. It remains 
asymptotically unbiased but not asymptotically normal if Ok = Oko [33]. Furthermore, in moderate- 
sized samples ffO~ may have better performance in terms of mean square rror than t20~ if Ok = Oko 
or Ok .~ Oko. Thus/~O~ is often recommended by statisticians because it is asymptotically efficient 
and yet has better moderate sample performance than gO1 provided the investigator's prior beliefs 
are correct or nearly correct. Nevertheless in the epidemiologic literature preliminary tests to 
determine whether C is a confounder, e.g. testing whether ORoc)g = 1 in a cumulative incidence 
follow-up study, are uniformly disparaged, for example see Kleinbaum, Kupper and Morgenstern 
[11, p. 254]. The preliminary test estimator is viewed as intuitively biased by epidemiologists. We 
suggest that epidemiologists regard as intuitively biased estimators that systematically deviate from 
the true population value to such an extent hat Wald-type confidence intervals centered on the 
estimator fail to give correct coverage properties even in large samples. A formal statistical concept 
that corresponds to this intuitive notion of unbiasedness is local uniform asymptotic unbiasedness. 
Let ~,  be an estimator of O1 based on n observations. Let 0A be the topological boundary of 
the parameter space in R k. The boundary may or may not be included in the parameter space. Let 
A*= A -0A.  We define an estimator to be locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased if 
VOo cA *, V sequences k. = Oo + ?Ix~n, ? ~ R k (27) 
under k., E[n I/2(~ln -- Oln)] = 0 
where 01. is the first component of k.. 
We are restricting attention to estimators Or. for which VOo ~ A *, x//-n (O l . -  O1) has under 
any sequence k. a nondegenerate, although not necessarily normal, limiting distribution with 
finite mean and variance. Our definition follows closely from Sen [33, Sections 4 and 5]. It 
follows immediately from Sen's Section 5 that ffO~ is locally uniformly asymptotically biased if 
Cov( l~Ol, /~Ok) ~ 0. 
A slightly different but more easily interpretable condition is as follows. An estimator ~.  is 
locally uniformly asymptotically median unbiased [34] if 
VOo ~ A* ,  there exists ~ > 0 s.t. 
0 ~J= {0 IO-Oo l  <a},sup{lp[~,<O~lO]-½1}--~Oe,~ as n - - *~.  
(28) 
For estimators that are locally uniformly asymptotically normal and unbiased, expressions (27) and 
(28) coincide; where by definition an estimator is locally uniformly asymptotically normal and 
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unbiased if 
VOoeA*, there exist t r>0 and functions a,(O)s.t. (29) 
supe~j {IP [(~Jn - Oi)/an(O) ~< z~ O] - ct l} ~0 as n --* oo [34], 
where J is as in expression (28). In fact expression (29) implies expressions (28) and (27). 
We now consider the relationship between equation (27) and Wald-type confidence intervals. By 
definition 631n can center a Wald type confidence interval for O ~ A only if there exists an(O) such 
that 
supe~A {[p [(~l~ - O~)/(r,(O) ~< za O] - ct I} --,0 as n --* ~ .  (30) 
It is obvious that if ec~ation (27) is false, expression (30) is false. Even if expression (29) holds, 
if for some O • dA, x/n (~l~ - O1 ) has a degenerate limiting distribution, expression (30) is false. 
For example, consider the unbiased estimator, x/n, of p when either p = 0 or p = 1 where x ~ 
Binomial (n, p), p e [0, 1]. In this example, even if the parameter space is restricted to A *, i.e. (0,1), 
and expression (29) holds, expression (30) is false because 
lim [n Var (x/n)] = 0. 
p~l  
Thus the intuitive concept of unbiasedness, i.e. equations (27) or (28), are necessary but not 
sufficient for ~n to center Wald-type confidence intervals. If expression (29) holds, then Ol, can 
center Wald intervals on any compact subspace of A* [34]. 
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APPENDIX  A 
In this Appendix ml, too, r~t, 'rio, ~RD = ,~j - r~ 0, Pr, Pg, NE, Ng, N and fl are as defined in Section 3(B). N I , N:, N3 
and N4 are as in Section 2(B). 
Theorem A. 1 
Under hypothetical rerandomizations N VarA(~RD) is given by equation (1). 
Proof. It follows from the equations on page 471 of Copas [9] (s~/ni in Copas is ,ill in our notation) that E (~RD) -mm - m0 
and 
Var(~RD) = =-c---: |~- ,  m, (1 - m, ) + moo - too) + mo + m, - 2m0% - ~ , (A. 1) 
.N - i. L/~E 
where Im~-mol ~<fl <<.min(mo+ml,2-mo-mt). One can show that ~RD is asymptotically normal. Equation (A.I) 
implies that N Vara(~RD) is given by equation (1), since equation (1) is derived from equation (A.I) by replacing N-  1 
by N and rearranging terms. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1 
It is straightforward to show that R = 0 if fl = 0 and m I = m 0. Since R is a strictly decreasing function of ~, we have 
that R<0i fm t=m oandf l#0.  
Next, without loss of generality, assume m~-m o > 0. Then, from the bounds on the range of r, we have, upon 
substituting ml-mo for /3 in equation (2), that R<~(2mo--ml)(l--ml)--mo(l--mo). Write ml=mo+g. Then 
tgR/Oo~ = -(2m o - ml) - (1 - ml) = 2(m1 - mo) - 1 = 2a - 1. Therefore, for 0 < g < ½, R is a strictly decreasing function 
of t,, and thus it follows that R < 0 from the results given in the preceeding paragraph for the case m, = mo. 
It only remains to show that for ½ < g ~< 1, R < 0. Since for ~ < a < 1, R is strictly increasing in ct, we need only evaluate 
R at max(g)= 1 -m 0' i.e., at m t = 1. But at m I = 1, R = -m0(1  - -mo)  <0 assuming m0>0.  
Theorem A.2 
/r~o(1 -- r~o)N (A.2) 
eRD+ 1 .96]  (NEN£) 
is a 95% large sample prediction interval for (O - EX)/Nr = [(Nir + N2E) -- (Nit + N3E)]/N. 
Proof Since NIE+ N3E = N~ + N 3 - Nt~ + N3g, we have 
. N~ moN 
(0 -EX) /NE=[t~,+mo~-~- -~E.  
Now tit t + r~(NE/Nr) is an observed random variable and moN/NE is a population parameter. Furthermore, since 
NEmo(l --m0) 
E(tho)=m o and Var(rh 0) 
(N -- 1)N£ 
[9] a 95% large sample confidence interval for (Nz/N)mo is 
N N /NE~o(1 -- r~ 0) N . . . . .  /~( !  - r~0)N 
~rn°  + i'96 ~4 N-NE- N" rn° * t'~° ~ e - X/ ( ~ ~.) -(-N-fNT)" 
This implies that a 95% prediction interval for (O - EX)/Ne is 
. . Ng _NN . . . .  /~o(1 -v~o)N 
mt +mo Ne+ N mo± 1.~0%/ (N~N~) 
which simplifies to equation (A.2). 
APPENDIX  B 
1. An estimator is a rule (function) that takes any observed ata set and produces a numerical estimate of a population 
parameter. "Estimates" are thus the observed value of an "estimator" in the data at hand. Two estimators are identical 
if they give identical estimates for all possible data outcomes. 
2. A confidence interval is a rule that gives for any data outcome an interval (the observed value of the confidence interval 
in the data at hand). A 95% confidence interval must by definition cover the X parameter of interest 95% of the time 
in hypothetical repetitions for all possible values of the model parameters. 
3. Local uniform asymptotic unbiasedness i  the statistical concept that corresponds to the epidemiologist's intuitive concept 
of"bias" [see Section 8(C)-(E)]. Estimators that are not locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased (i.e. intuitively biased 
estimators) systematically deviate from the true population parameter in hypothetical repetitions of the study to such 
an extent hat large-sample confidence intervals based on the estimate + 1.96 standard errors fail to give 95% probability 
of coverage of the true parameter (since such intervals are not centered on the true parameter on average). The usual 
statistical definition of exact small sample bias has no relation to the intuitive concept of bias. For example, the ratio 
of observed proportions, the intuitively unbiased estimator of the risk ratio, has an exact bias of infinity. Consistent 
estimators and even asmpotically unibased estimators that are not locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased are 
intuitively biased, and are statistically unsuitable for centering large-sample confidence intervals. For example the 
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backward elimination (i.e. preliminary test) estimator described in Section 5(B) on prior knowledge versus prior belief 
is consistent and asymptotically unbiased but locally uniformly asymptotically biased [see Section 8(E)]. 
4. Efficient estimators have minimum variance (asymptotic) among all (locally uniformly asymptotically unbiased) 
estimators. Practically, this means that 95% confidence intervals based on an efficient estimator + 1.96 times an 
estimated standard error are narrower on the average than those based on inefficient estimators. In this paper we 
consider any estimator that is not efficient o be inefficient. Therefore, inefficient estimators include all biased estimators 
and all nonoptimal unbiased estimators. 
5. Inference in large samples and sparse data. Large sample (asymptotic) inference generally refers to inference based on 
tests and confidence intervals which attain their nominal significance l vels and coverage probabilities only in samples 
of sufficient size that normal approximations are adequate. In this paper, we use the term "large-sample inference" 
specifically to refer to situations in which the number of parameters emains fixed as the sample size increases. A more 
appropriate choice of terms might have been "large stratum inference." We use the term "sparse data" to refer to 
situations in which the number of parameters would increase with sample size as, for example, in a matched pair case 
control study. 
6. Consistency. An estimator of a population parameter is consistent if the estimate obtained from a sample consisting 
of the entire near-infinite population equals the population parameter. 
7. Fisher consistency. A method of estimation is Fisher consistent if, whenever the proportions in the observed ata equal 
true population proportions, the estimate of any parameter equals its true population value. 
8. Maximum likelihood estimators and the centering of confidence intervals. In sufficiently large samples the maximum 
likelihood estimator of any parameter + 1.96 standard errors determine a 950 confidence interval. The sample size 
required will be much less if the maximum likelihood estimator is symmetrically distributed even in moderate sized 
samples. Thus confidence intervals for a given parameter of interest (e.g. the odds ratio or risk ratio) would often be 
constructed by exponentiating a confidence interval for the In OR or In RR since the distribution of the maximum 
likelihood estimator of the logarithm is more neady symmetric in moderate sized samples. 
9. The minimalsufficient s atistic is the smallest summary of the data that contains all the information concerning the model 
parameters. For example, for inference on the probability of success based on 50 binomial trials, the total number of 
successes i  the minimal sufficient statistic. The observed order of successes and failures contains no additional 
information. 
APPENDIX  C 
Theorem C. 1 
In the follow-up study of Section 6(D) with simple random sampling conditional on exposure statistics, if ORec = I, then, 
in the notation defined in Sections 6(B)--(D), 
KG F (Pll--Pl2) [ (p21--P22)[ptlpl+l+Pt2(l--pl+l)]'] [ 1 
E(cRRIG) = sMR + 2---~¢/--~ LP2lPl + ~ +P22(~--PI+I) [P~tPl +~-P-~ -----~-] +I -~ J + o ~) ,  
where without loss of generality, we have assumed the special case x I + + = x2+ + = N for notational simplicity, and we use 
as our approximate ancillary 
fiRDrc - 0 (xl + l - x2+ t)/N 
G=~ar0aRD,c)  J2  (x++l ' / (1 -x++, '~ '  
N\2NJ\ 2N / 
Proof. Use the fact that 
Pl+l -P(C IE) ,  and K -  (Pl+l)( 1 --Pl+l)' 
+ - -  + o (N -I/2) 
E --if- =Pl+l 2~/~ 
to expand conditional on G, 
tc r -~, j=~l~, -  ~ ~ - -  - -  E - - - - + - - - -  
L. I+l xl+ 2 N x2+ I N x2+ 2 N 
in a Taylor series. 
It follows that a sufficient condition for ERR to be asymptotically biased for the sMR conditional on G is that G # 0 
and that the effect of C on disease be in the same direction in the exposed and unexposed. 
Theorem C.2 
In the follow-up study of Section 6(D) with simple random sampling with conditional on exposure and ORec = I, 
Var x (~RR) i> VaN (~sMR) =Var  A (~RRIG = 0) = Var A ffsMRIG = 0) 
with equality only if, YG asymptotic bias (~RRIG)= 0 for the sMR where Var A are to O (N-l). 
Proof. We first prove the following lemma. 
Lemma I
In the follow-up study of Section 6(D) with simple random sampling with OREc = I, to O (N-*) 
E [Var A (~RRIG)] = E [Var A (rsMRIG)] = Var x (~RRIG = 0) = "Car a(~sM RIG = 0) 
Proof. E [Var A (SRRI ~]  = Var x [~RR IG -- E (G) ffi 0] to O (N-  I ) by the usual properties of large sample xpectations. A 
similar result holds with ~sMR in place of 8RR. But if b = 0, then 8RR = ~sMR, proving the lemma. 
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Proof of  Theorem C.2. Since E(~sMR - sMR[b') = o (N-l/2), VarA[E (~sMRJG)] = 0 to O (N- l ) .  Thus we have equality 
in Theorem C.2 if and only if Vara[E(~RR[~')] = 0 to O (N - l )  which will occur if and only if E [ (~RR-  sMR[~')] = 
o (N-  u2) Q.E.D. 
APPENDIX  D 
Theorem D. 1 
In the unmatched case-control study of Section 6(E) if ORoc,~ -- 1 so that ~OR = ~sOR, Var ~ (fisOR) ~< Var a (~OR) with 
equality if and only if OR~cl~ = 1 as well where Var A are to O (N-  ~ ). 
Proof. From the results of Section 6, since ~OR is ~sOR, the theorem will be true if 
OREcI~=I implies E ( f i sOR l~)=sOR to O(N -1/2) (D.I) 
when ~ is an approximate ancillary corresponding to ORocl~ = 1. Equation (D.I) will hold if and only if 
E ( f i sOR[X)=E(~OR[ ,~)  to O(N-~/2). (D.2) 
Equation (D.2) will hold if and only if to O(N -~/2) conditional on ,~, 
+ = + + = - - 
L (F + ~) ] 
where 
F = x~lXF  = x2u YF = xl21 QXYF  = xul,  B = x222, CB = x212, EB = xm2UCBE = xu2. 
But E(X-  C J~) is O (N-i/2) since X/C  = fiORocl~. Therefore equation (D.2) will hold if and only if E(Y -  E 1.2/) is 
O(N-~/2)~.OREclb = 1 since Y/E  is fiOREcl~. 
By essentially the same proof, we have. 
Corollary D. 1 
The theorem is true with the roles of ORoc,g and OR~c,6 reversed. 
Corollary D.2 
In the unmatched follow-up study of Section 6(D), if ORocl~ = 1, Var ~(fisMR) ~< Var ~(~RR) to O (N- I )  with equality 
only if OR~c = 1 as well. 
